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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j): "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over . . . cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from
the Supreme Court."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the purported assignment by Paul

Wrathall to Maxwell Johnson in 1946 of a one-half undivided interest in an easement
appurtenant, without the concurrent conveyance of any interest in the dominant estate, validly
conveyed an interest in the Easement enforceable against Defendants when they acquired the
servient estate in 1990. (Issue preserved, R. at 190-91, 466 f 1.)
2.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to rule that Defendants were bona fide

purchasers not subject to the purported Wrathall-Johnson assignment, inasmuch as there
could be no constructive notice since Plaintiffs did not file the agreement containing the
purported assignment until five years after Defendants purchase of the property was
recorded, and inasmuch as there could be no actual notice since there was no evidence of use
under the easement which was obvious upon inspection. (Issue preserved, R. at 187-88,466

t2.)
3.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs have a prescriptive

easement in the Blue Lakes despite the fact that
a.

81776 HI321 002

the original use was permissive, and continued so until 1995 (issue

1

preserved, R. at 465-66 f 4, 488 ^ 31);
b.

Plaintiffs' use was not open, since it involved no overt action on the part

of Plaintiffs, but simply the natural accumulation of water in the South Blue Lake
spilling around the impounding dike, flowing into the North Blue Lake basin, then (if
the volume were great enough) trickling out of a breach in the north dike and into the
scar of an old ditch, and thence into a ditch owned by Plaintiffs and others, and then
if the headgate were properly set, into a lateral ditch leading to Plaintiffs' land (issue
preserved, id, see also 486-87 If 34, 38, & 40; 488-89 ff 26-29); and
c.

Plaintiffs' use was not continuous, inasmuch as Plaintiffs did not store

water in the Blue Lakes at any time between a time no later than 1960 and 1986 (issue
preserved, id, see also 486-87fflf40-41).
4.

Whether the trial court erred in permanently enjoining Defendants from

interfering in any way with the Plaintiffs' free and full use of the Blue Lakes Reservoir, its
dikes and related facilities, to the total exclusion of any use by Defendants. (Issue preserved,
R. at 464-66 ff 1,4-9.)
Standard of Review for Issues 1, 2, 3, & 4: "Some issues involve mixed questions
of 'whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' Although we
review the underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard, we have
recently stated that the legal effect of those facts 'is the province of the appellate courts, and
no deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law.' Drake v.
Industrial Commission of Utah. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (quoting, respectively, State
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v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) and State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah
1994)).
5.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants' Motion to Join

Indispensable Parties, which would have required the joinder of all persons owning either
an interest in the Higley Well water or an interest in the Blue Lakes Reservoir easement as
an appurtenance to the real property now owned by them, originally owned by Paul Wrathall
at the time he was granted the water storage easement by Browns and Anderson in 1946.
(Issue preserved, R. at 56-66.)
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's determination properly entered under Rule
19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." LePet. Inc. v. Mower. 872 P.2d 470,
473 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), aff d sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)).
6.

Whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the 20-inch pipeline

crossing Plaintiffs' property is inadequate to carry the flow from the Higley Wells, and that
Defendant Arthur Higley, who owns only one-sixth of the water rights in the Higley Wells,
is solely liable for the flooding of Plaintiffs' property in the winter of 1996-97. (Issue
preserved, R. at 475-78ffll65-66, 74.)
Standard of Review: On appellate review, purely factual questions require reversal
only if a finding is clearly erroneous. Drake. 939 P.2d at 181 f citing State v. Thurman. 911
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)).
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7.

Whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Defendant Arthur

Higley wrongfully and tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs' Easement rights and converted
Plaintiffs' water in storage to his own use or caused the storage water to run to waste (issue
preserved, R. at 472, 477fflf68, 85).
Standard of Review: On appellate review, purely factual questions require reversal
only if a finding is clearly erroneous. Drake. 939 P.2d at 181 (citing Thurman. 911 P.2d at
372).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3, as to issue number 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal is from a final judgment entered January 9, 1998, in this civil action
between neighboring property owners in Tooele County. R. at 524-37. After a five-day
bench trial held on September 10,15-16, and 29-30, 1997, which also included an on-site but
non-record property inspection by the trial court on September 24, 1997, the lower court
decreed that plaintiffs Johnson held a permanent and arguably exclusive easement to use the
land of defendants Higley to store water in the Blue Lakes Reservoir sitting mostly on land
of Higleys. The court found that the storage easement arose originally by contract in 1946
which was still valid but also was confirmed by so-called prescriptive subsequent use.
Conclusions of Law Nos. 40-49, R. at 526-28.
The trial court rejected claims of Higleys that the purported assignment to plaintiffs'
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father Max Johnson, signed in 1946 but never recorded at the county recorder's office until
1995, of a 50% interest in a storage easement given to Paul Wrathall, was legally invalid, that
Johnson had abandoned that easement, that a provision of a 1950 court decree had precluded
Johnsons from using the easement, and that the prescriptive use requirements for obtaining
a new easement had not been met. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 6-43,
Conclusions of Law Nos. 1-9, R. at 464-66, 485-96.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The complaint in this case was filed on January 24, 1997, in the Third District Court
in and for Tooele County. Discovery involved a single set of interrogatories and a single
request for production of documents from each side. Defendants filed a motion on May 21,
1998, to compel joinder of indispensable parties or to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. This
motion was heard on July 30, 1997, and denied the same day. The order was entered on
September 3, 1997. On August 11, 1997, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was heard on September 3, 1997, and denied the same day. The corresponding order
was entered on January 8, 1998.
Trial was held on September 10, 15-16, 29-30, 1997. Closing arguments were heard
on October 29, 1997. The court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on January 9,
1998. Defendants filed notice of appeal on February 5, 1998.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs Johnson and their Property. Plaintiffs Russell and Peter Johnson are
brothers who engage in cattle ranching near Grantsville, Tooele County, where Russell was
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born in 1952 and has lived virtually his entire life. R. at 557, p. 12. They are sons of
Maxwell Johnson, who died in about 1979 or 1980. R. at 557, p. 38. Plaintiffs inherited
from their father the Johnson cattle ranch property north and downhill from Grantsville,
Tooele County. Id The 1981 decree of distribution of the ranch property from the estate of
Maxwell Johnson says nothing about any easement to store water in the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh.
3;R. at 558, p. 258.
Water for the irrigated portion, consisting of 192.5 acres, of the Johnson ranch
property historically was delivered before and after the 1950 litigation described below via
a series of ditches in water rotation turns from the western branch or "turn" of a nearby
spring-fed stream called Fishing Creek. Tr. Exh. 10, 1950 Findings of Fact nos. 5 & 9; Tr.
Exh. 14 (admitted for illustrative purposes only); R. at 557, pp. 14-18. Since the conclusion
of the 1950 litigation, the water from the west turn of Fishing Creek has run in a northerly
direction past the east side of the Blue Lakes beyond the north end of the Blue Lakes where
the ditch curves and runs to the northwest and then north again to the Johnson property. Id
Johnsons obtain their Fishing Creek water from a lateral ditch off the west turn of the Fishing
Creek ditch. R. at 558, pp. 199-200.
The Blue Lakes. The Blue Lakes are nearly-adjoining large ponds each covering
many dozens of acres impounding water behind artificial dikes on low-lying land located
on the northern outskirts of Grantsville, Utah, in Tooele County. R. at 557, 558, Tr. 24-27,
35-37, 397. Prior to and as of late 1950, the Blue Lakes consisted "of two natural ponds
which have been enlarged and improved so that they will store water; that one of said ponds
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is southwest from the other and both are located in section 20 [of T. 2 South, R. 5 West, S.
L. B. & M.]. Trial Exh. 10, Finding of Fact no. 9 at p. 14 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, dated Sept. 9, 1950 in Castagno & Maxwell Johnson et al. v. Paul Wrathall et aL
Dist. Ct. For Tooele Co., Case No. 3559 (hereinafter the "1950 litigation"). See also Trial
Exh. 31, a map exhibit from the 1950 litigation showing two ponds. R. at 561, p. 774.
Newer dikes were charted in design plan drawings made in late 1946 for a new
proposed dam signed and submitted jointly by Paul Wrathall and Max Johnson as claimed
owners in early 1947. Tr. Exh. 18. When those dikes were finally built, apparently after the
findings entered in the 1950 litigation but by 1952, when they appear on an aerial photo, they
created a new third pond, dividing and taking the upper part of what became the middle
pond. R. at 558, 561, pp. 331, 792-93. That new third pond created by the new dikes, the
most southerly pond at the highest elevation, extended south well into section 29 and was
designed to impound up to 227 acre feet of water covering up to 85 acres. Trial Exh. 18; R.
at 558, pp. 197-98, 256-58. Arthur Higley testified that the new south pond presently covers
119 acres, and the two north ponds combined cover another area the same size as the south
pond. R. at 561, 792. This newer south pond provided the storage capacity for the 1986
Application of plaintiff Russell Johnson to appropriate and store effluent sewer water from
the Grantsville sewer ponds first built in the 1970's. Trial Exh's 16 & 50, and R. at 557, pp.
35-37.
Defendants Higley and their 1990 Purchase of Property, including Blue Lakes
Land, Defendant Arthur Higley was born in 1941. R. at 561, pp. 747. He was raised and
81776 HI321002
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lived in Grantsville until he was 39 years old, or until about early 1981. R. at 559, p. 497.
After he married, he moved to Salt Lake County to live there with his wife Susan. Id Arthur
has worked in the Grantsville area all his life, even after his marriage. R. at 561, p. 747. He
has been in the business of raising cattle and farming all his life. R. at 559, pp. 497-98.
Arthur has been familiar with the Blue Lakes for most of his life, and helped cleaning ditches
in that area beginning when he was six or seven years old. R. at 561, 759.
Arthur and Susan Higley jointly acquired the land underlying most of the Blue Lakes,
together with other surrounding land, by purchase in March, 1990, pursuant to a contract for
deed recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's office that month. R. at 561, p.767; Exh.
9 (reproduced at Tab 1 of Addendum). At the time of the purchase, Susan made no
inspection of the property, but Arthur was familiar with the ditches which would convey the
water rights he acquired in connection with that purchase. R. at 559, pp. 486, 502. He
visited the area several times per year, cleaning ditches and doing other work there. Id.
Arthur also inspected the ditches in 1990, to see where he would be taking his water. R. at
559, pp. 502-3. He did not then talk to any of the property owners of the lands crossed by
those ditches. R. at 559, p. 504. He did no research concerning those water rights at the
time, other than to check a green book put out by the State Engineer's office concerning
water right determinations, which mentioned that the court decree in the 1950 litigation
governed such rights. R. at 559, 561, pp. 509, 787. He saw no need to further research the
water rights he acquired as his seller warranted them. R. at 561, p. 787. Arthur knew that
the Blue Lakes and their associated dikes were there at the time of his purchase. R. at 559,
81776 HI321 002

8

p. 498.
Applications to Store Water at the Blue Lakes. On November 20, 1945, Paul
Wrathall filed an application with the Utah State Engineer to Appropriate Water for
Irrigation Purposes in the State of Utah (hereinafter the "Wrathall Application"). Thereby,
Paul Wrathall sought to appropriate Fishing Creek water which would be stored on the SE
1/4 of SW 1/4; SW 1/4 of SE 1/4 of Section 20., T.2 S., R. 5 W., SLB&M, hereinafter
referred to as the "Wrathall Parcel 1", an area then only partly covered by the Blue Lakes,
and on adjoining northern parts of section 29, for the benefit of parts of sections 5, 6, 7, and
8 of T2S, R5W, SLB&M. Tr. Exh's. 18, 19, 50 & 56.
At the time the Wrathall Application was filed, Paul Wrathall owned no real property
in said sections 5, 7, or 8, but did own the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 and the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4
of Section 6, T2S, R5W, SLB&M, which is now owned by Rulon Higley, a brother to
Defendant Arthur Higley, and is herein referred to as the "Wrathall Parcel 2". Tr. Exh's. 10
(Decree^), 50 & 55.
One day before the Wrathall Application was filed, Maxwell Johnson, Plaintiffs'
father, also filed a similar Application with the Utah State Engineer to Appropriate Water for
Irrigation Purposes in the State of Utah (hereinafter the "Johnson Application"). Thereby,
Maxwell Johnson sought to appropriate Fishing Creek water and to store the same on
Wrathall Parcel 1 and on adjoining northern parts of section 29, to benefit parts of Sections
17, 18, 19 and 20 T2S, R5W, SLB&M. Tr. Exh's. 18, 19, 50 & 56. Both the Wrathall
Application and the Johnson Application were approved by the Utah State Engineer. Tr.
81776 HI321002
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Exh. 19.
Easement Granting Wrathall the Right to Store Water on Land underlying Blue
Lakes, Not until January 15, 1946, nearly two months after the Applications were filed, did
J. Keith Brown and Elba H. Brown, his wife, and Penina Anderson, who then owned the
ground in question, grant an easement in the Wrathall Parcel 1 and other real property to Paul
Wrathall. Tr. Exh. 7 (reproduced under Tab 2 of Addendum hereto). Browns and Anderson
are the predecessors-in-interest of Defendants Higley as the owners of the land on which the
Blue Lakes are located. The easement provided that it "shall not exceed the natural reservoir
basin", and that the easement is only large enough to be "sufficient to contain waters run
thereupon the the [sic] natural course thereof; (hereinafter the "Easement"). The Easement
was recorded with the Tooele County Recorder on March 6, 1946. Tr. Exh. 7.
Assignment of Interest in Easement to Max Johnson. On May 14, 1946, Paul and
Carrie Wrathall, husband and wife, signed an Agreement which purports to assign to
Maxwell Johnson, Plaintiffs father, an undivided one-half interest in the Easement. (the
"Agreement"). Tr. Exh. 10, which 1950 court papers contain a copy of the Agreement as
an exhibit in that action.1 While the Easement was appurtenant to only Wrathall's land, the
Agreement explains in its first whereas clause that its intent is to allow Maxwell Johnson to
store at the Blue Lakes a portion of his winter water from Fishing Creek as applied for in the
Johnson Application. Wrathall did not deed his property to the Johnsons. R. at 558, p. 332.
1

Another copy of that same Agreement, as recorded in 1995 in the Tooele County
Recorder's office, was received into evidence as Trial Exhibit 11. A copy thereof is attached
hereto under Tab 3 of the Addendum.
81776 HI321 002

10

The Agreement says nothing about allowing Maxwell Johnson to use the Easement for
storage of water from any other source beyond the natural runoff addressed in the Easement
itself. The Agreement notes that Wrathalls had easements covering "more land than is
covered by the present dike and reservoir and that this Assignment covers only the easement
in the lands upon which said dike and reservoir are located,. . .." fcL, at § 6.
The 1950 Litigation. At the time of the Easement and Agreement, it was the practice
to flood the waters of Fishing Creek in the winter months over the upstream lands of the
upper users, including the lands of the Browns, to get it to the lands of the lower users,
including Johnsons. Tr. Exh. 10, 1950 Findings of Fact Nos. 5-6. The practice of flooding
the winter water and the construction of obstructions to prevent the flow of the water from
the lands of the upper users to those of the lower users was the subject of the 1950 litigation.
Tr. Exh. 10.
A careful review of the 1950 litigation pleadings contained in Trial Exhibit 10 shows
that the plaintiffs in that earlier action, who were the lower end users of Fishing Creek water,
were attempting to procure rights to greater quantities of Fishing Creek water from the
defendants there, the upper end users of Fishing Creek water. Tr. Exh. 10. That complaint,
filed in 1949, was verified by Max Johnson, father of the plaintiffs at bar. Id The answer
and counterclaim in the 1950 litigation for most of the defendants there was verified by Paul
Wrathall. Id. The Agreement assigning an interest in the Easement to Johnson, while
included as an exhibit in that 1950 litigation, is not otherwise expressly mentioned in any of
the 1950 litigation filings presented at trial here, nor does it seem to have been particularly
81776 HI321002
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at issue in that earlier lawsuit. However, that 1950 litigation did impact and undercut that
Assignment Agreement to a limited extent as to conveyance of Fishing Creek water by the
former practice of flooding over the lands of upper users by (1) Finding of Fact nos. 9 and
14 of the 1950 litigation, requiring that a new connecting ditch be dug to join the west turn
of the Fishing Creek ditch to the outlet ditch leading from the Blue Lakes, and exclusively
used when built, to provide a bypass alternative to the earlier route of running Fishing Creek
water of Johnsons and others through the lower or northern Blue Lakes, and (2) the
affirmative deletion by Judge Crockett in 1950 of proposed Conclusion of Law no. 6. See
Tr. Exh. 10, Findings of Fact, ft 9 & 14 & Conclusions of Law, f 6, also reproduced under
Tab 4 of. Addendum hereto.
That proposed conclusion, before it was hand-stricken and court-initialed, read:
The plaintiffs Worthington and Johnson should be adjudged to have the right
to divert water through the existing west ditch to the Blue Lakes, through the
Blue Lakes to the headgate on the northerly end thereof, through said headgate
into the existing ditch which leads to and across the lands of the plaintiff
Johnson; that suitable measuring devices should be installed thereon as is
provided in the Findings of Fact, and the headgate on the Blue lakes should be
left unlocked.
Lapsing of Johnson and Wrathall Storage Applications. Shortly after the end of
the 1950 litigation, Johnson's Application with the State Engineer lapsed, on October 25,
1950, for failure to file any proof of appropriation when due. Tr. Exh. 32. Wrathall's similar
Application also later lapsed for the same reason on September 20, 1953. Tr. Exh. 32 & 50.
Grantsville City Sewer Treatment Ponds. At some time about 1972-3, Grantsville
City built treatment ponds for sewer water near the Blue Lakes to receive the outflow from
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the new city sewer system. R. at 557, pp. 22-23. While they were designed to be selfcontaining for many years, they did begin to leak a little after a while. R. at 561, p. 632, 643.
Mr. Kertamus, the public works director for Grantsville City in charge of the overseeing the
sewer plant operations since 1990, testified the original overflow from the sewer ponds was
on the north end of the ponds, to the west of the Blue Lakes dikes, and flowed north, not
toward or into the Blue Lakes. R. at 561, p. 636. Rulon and Arthur Higley each testified
similarly. R. at 561, pp. 678, 768-69.
Russell Johnson testified that he saw sewer effluent seep out of the sewer ponds as
early as 1973, before he left to serve a church mission that year, and flow from thence into
the Blue Lakes. R. at 557-8, pp. 22-24, 526-30. On cross-examination, Russell admitted that
normally, in the summer months, Grantsville City did not discharge anything into the Blue
lakes. R. at 558, p. 241. Sherman Higley also testified that some sewer water went into the
Blue Lakes while the sewer overflow discharge location was still at the north end of the
sewer ponds. R. at 560, 602. On redirect, Russell Johnson further testified that there were
two means by which sewer water effluent escaped the City's sewer ponds: the designed
overflow outlet and seepage through sewer pond walls into an unmetered drainage ditch
which ran into the Blue Lakes, and that both sources were discharging sewer water into the
Blue Lakes in March of 1990, when the City's official discharge measuring device, a Parshall
Flume, showed no effluent leaving the sewer ponds. R. at 559, pp. 469-72; Tr. Exh. 53.
The point of discharge from the sewer ponds was changed by the mid-1980's and the
overflow of the sewer pond effluent ran out of the east side of the Grantsville City sewer
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ponds and directly onto land owned by Grantsville City and from there on to Defendants'
land where it was impounded in the newer south pond of the Blue Lakes, created by the
construction, some time after 1950, of what was labeled the West Dike and the North Dike
on design and construction plans submitted to the office of the Utah State Engineer in 1947
by Paul Wrathall and Maxwell Johnson. R. at 561, pp. 636, Tr. Exh. 18.
According to Grantsville's official records, in the months of June through December,
1989, there was no sewer effluent discharged into the South Blue Lakes Reservoir. In the
months of January and February, 1990, there was some discharge of sewer effluent onto the
portion of the Blue Lakes owned by Grantsville City, but it was insufficient for the City to
determine a quantity. In the month of March 1990, when Defendants purchased the real
property on which the Blue Lakes are located, and thereafter through December, 1991, there
was no sewer effluent discharged into the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh. 53.
Use of Blue Lakes by Johnsons. Arthur Higley testified that Max Johnson, before
his death, and others, told Arthur that early on, perhaps in the period of 1945-50, that
Wrathall and Johnson stopped using and abandoned use of the Blue Lakes for water storage
because water accumulating there was so salty that it killed their crops when turned onto
their lands. R. at 559, pp. 513-14. This would explain why Max Johnson and Wrathall let
their applications lapse in 1950 & 1953.
Arthur Higley further testified that the dike impounding water in the north Blue Lake
washed out sometime before 1960, and was never repaired until Russell Johnson did some
partial repair work in the 1980's. R. at 559, pp. 515-16. This was corroborated by the
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testimony of Howard Clegg. R. at 561, p. 714-16.
Arthur Higley further stated that to his knowledge, the Blue Lakes were not used by
Johnsons for flood control or other purposes, but only for duck hunting and for trapping rats.
R. at 559, p. 516. This was substantiated by trial exhibits 23 & 51 (Reproduced in under Tab
5 of Addendum hereto). Exhibit 23 is a letter from the State Engineer's office to Russell
Johnson dated June 2, 1986, sent to summarize discussions held with him at an inspection
of the new dikes of the Blue Lakes about two weeks before. It contained the statement that
"Mr. Johnson stated that the reservoir had not actively been used for many years and that to
his knowledge there was no valid water right for the water in the reservoir." Id ; R. at 557,
pp. 32-34; Exh. 23.
When Russell's counsel asked him what he meant by that statement, Mr. Johnson
explained he had been referring to the fact that a headgate and pipes which previously in
Wrathall's day allowed water to flow in a controlled fashion from the south pond to the north
pond had been inoperable for an unknown but lengthy time, but that those failures of long
before did not prevent the south pond from containing water which ran into it, which when
full enough, spilled water to the east around a dike to and through the north lakes basin from
whence it flowed to Johnson's land when headgates located further downstream in the
Fishing Creek ditch were set properly. R. at 557, 558, pp. 34-35, 199-200.
The following testimony on direct examination was there given by Russell Johnson:
Q.:
A.:
81776 HI321002

You did not advise the State Engineer's office that the ponds
themselves were no longer used or hadn't been used for a long time?
No. I basically informed them that we need to make an upgrade. They
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gave me the chance to abandon it at that time. I says, Well, geez, I
don't want to abandon it. You know, we've had this easement, you
know, for years, and I didn't want to abandon it. And I took the proper
steps to secure the water right and to fix it up.
Russell's handwritten reply to the State Engineer's letter speaks in the future tense,
and it begins: "I would like to use the blue lakes and am willing to repair or put in new the
following which will make the dam safe and useable [sic]. . . . (2) put in a spillway if
needed, I feel the water would never overflow if I was to use it." Tr. Exh. 51.
On cross-examination, Russell Johnson further testified as follows:
A.:
Q.:
A.:

Q.:
A.:

Q.:

A.:
Q.:
A.:
Q.:
A.:
Q.:
A.:
Q.:
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I've personally witnessed water flowing through these water courses
into the Blue Lakes.
When did you first witness that?
As long as I've been alive, I cannot remember a time when at least the
flood waters did not flow into Blue Lakes, for as long as I can
remember. Say back at least ten years, I can remember going down in
this area swimming, hunting, trapping muskrats. These ditches were
there and they were flowing into the Blue Lakes.
Was anybody diverting that flood water into those—into that upper-the
most southerly portion?
At ten years old, I don't know if they were or were not. From my
knowledge and my study, yes, people were diverting water into the
Blue Lakes.
Do you have any knowledge of anybody diverting water into that
upper—into this most southerly portion that you depicted on your
illustrative map?
From approximately the time I can recollect, ten years old, yes.
Who was doing that?
I'm not aware of who was doing it.
So you don't know that anybody was directing water into that area, do
you?
I seen the water going in. Whether they directed it whether it was not
directed, I have no idea. I remember water going in there.
Okay. So just water that was running free; is that correct?
I have no knowledge if it's running free or it was diverted.
Was it in a ditch?
16

A.:
Q.:
A.:

Yes. Some was, some was not.
Okay. Whenever it flooded, why, water would run to the low spot and
that was a low spot; is that correct?.
Yes. This has been a flood drainage area. It's a low spot. All the
water basically come to that area.

R. at 558, pp. 207-209.
While Russell claimed and believed that his predecessors stored water in the Blue
Lakes during and before the 1940fs, and into the 1950fs, he acknowledged that he had no
personal knowledge that they did so, nor did he have any idea of the volume or dates. R. at
558, 219. Russell Johnson further admitted that he never diverted any Fishing Creek water
into the south lake, and didn't know whether anyone else ever had. R. at 558, pp. 209, 214.
Russell Johnson, the only one of the two plaintiffs to give any testimony at trial, could
only recall putting Fishing Creek water into any other of the Blue Lakes on only two
occasions, during years he couldn't pinpoint, sometime earlier than ten years before trial,
when he simply flushed out the northerly pond, apparently without taking any affirmative
action to ever store any water there. R. at 558, pp. 217-18. Russell further stated that it was
probably in 1986, or 11 years before trial, when the north pond was last full or stored water,
and that the decision to not use the north pond since then to store any water, but to use it
instead only as route of "bypass", was deliberate to avoid evaporation losses, although he
thought that at some future time he might want to store water there. R. at 557, pp. 37-38.
Thus, Plaintiffs conceded that from 1986 on, the only significant water accumulated only in
the south lake.
Russell testified that he personally did not control sewer or flood waters which
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naturally accumulated in the Blue Lakes, and never diverted any water into the Blue Lakes
except in the attenuated sense, after 1986, that he had the legal right to "divert" sewer water
into the Blue Lakes which ran from property of Grantsville City into the south pond,
apparently without any particular physical effort from Russell or his family or other agent
thereof. R. at 558, pp. 216-17.
Not until June of 1986 did Plaintiff Russell Johnson file an application to appropriate
the Grantsville City sewer pond effluent and to store it in the Blue Lakes. Tr. Exh. 50
(Application no. A61838). The 1986 application was approved by the Utah State Engineer
but limited to only .39 cfs (cubic feet per second, which is 24 acre feet per 31 day month and
23.4 acre feet per 30 day month, as calculated from conversion tables shown in trial exhibit
33). Tr. Exh. 16. Although the outflow from the sewer ponds periodically exceeds .39 cfs,
the excess outflow is unappropriated public water which flows to the Great Salt Lake. Tr.
Exh 53, R. at 170-71. The total capacity of the South Blue Lakes Reservoir is 230 acre feet.
R. at 557, p. 37; Tr. Exh. 16.
Thus, it would take almost 10 months of continuous influx of sewer water at the full
rate allowed to Russell Johnson with no evaporation to completely fill the south pond. This
never happened. Only in or about 1986, after the floods of 1983, did Plaintiffs use the
backhoe of their cousin Alan Johnson to do a little dike work, plug holes, they trapped out
some muskrats and installed a new outlet from the South Blue Lakes Reservoir to control the
water flow through that dike and across the almost dry bottom land of the north pond over
land of Higleys and then others to Plaintiffs' property where Plaintiffs used the sewer
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effluent for irrigation. R. at 557, 558, pp. 30-31, 376. Russell admitted that as of March
1990, the new outlet pipe would have been underwater and likely not visible from a surface
view, and that the old Wrathall diversions works at the dike didn't work. R. at 558, pp. 32729.
Howard Clegg, a former owner of the Blue Lakes from 1970 to about 1990, when
asked if anyone put any water into the Blue Lakes while he owned them, said:
The only water when we owned it was water that would raise in the spring on the
ground above. Depending on how wet the year was, it would run some water down
into the Blue Lakes. But they were washed out and stored a little bit of water, but not
much. Enough to show there was water around.
R. at 561, pp. 714-15.
The 1986 application for storage of sewer water was made and approved without
anyone ever seeking or obtaining consent from the owners of the servient land. R. at 559,
561, pp.478-79, 714-16, 823. In fact, when Russell's counsel asked him whether he or his
father ever sought permission of the landowner to store water in the Blue Lakes or to operate
or maintain them, he said no and added, when asked if that operation was done under a claim
of entitlement: "I—my understanding was that he [Russell's father, Max Johnson] had an
easement and he was working under that easement." R. at 559, pp. 478-79. Russell also
testified that he believed that he [Russell] had permission of the landowners to store water
in the Blue Lakes until that permission was withdrawn by Arthur Higley in 1995. R. at 557,
558, pp. 76,231. After it was approved and later certificated in about 1992, through the time
of trial, Russell Johnson's right to store water in the Blue Lakes arising from his 1986

81776 HI321 002

19

application was the only valid water storage right in the Blue Lakes granted by the State
Engineer's office, although Arthur Higley also had an application pending with but not yet
approved by that same office at the time of trial to store naturally occurring waters in the
Blue Lakes. R. at 557, pp. 150-51; Tr. Exh. 16.
While Alan Johnson, a first cousin to Plaintiffs, who was not born until 1962, also
testified that "Russell and the Johnsons have always—have used that Wrathall reservoir," the
only foundation for that testimony was that Alan had been "running cattle down there since
either 1990 or '91."

R. at 558, pp. 367, 371-2, 376.

Similarly, Cory Brown, who was only 37 years old at the time of trial, or born about
1960, said that for as long as he could remember, about 30 years, the Blue Lakes had been
"used" by the Johnsons, and that during that time, he had witnessed water being taken from
the Blue Lakes into a ditch taking water from the reservoir to the Johnson property, "mostly
continuous, except for a couple of dry years." R. at 559, pp. 449-51. Cory also said that
local kids used to use the reservoir for ice skating and recreation, and that when Cory was
little he saw Russell's and Peter's father "use the reservoir." Id at 451. On crossexamination, Cory clarified that prior to three or four years before trial, the ditch coming out
of the reservoir only had water in it when it was spring or a wet part of the year, that he saw
Plaintiffs father cleaning the ditch coming out of the reservoir at least once at an earlier but
unspecified time, but that he had only seen Russell cleaning ditches and putting in headgates
in that area "just in the last ten years." R. at 559, 458-60.
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Is the Higley Purchase of Blue Lakes land Subject to Notice of any Use of
Johnsons? Higleys concede they had notice in 1990, when they purchased the land at issue,
that Paul Wrathall had been given the Easement recorded in 1946 to store water in the
original Blue Lakes on part of that land Higleys were purchasing. Tr. Exh 22. But Higleys
had no actual notice that Wrathall had executed the Agreement, then 44 years old, purporting
to assign a 50% interest in that Easement, claiming to grant to Plaintiffs' father a right to use
and store water with Paul Wrathall in the Blue Lakes. R. at 561, p. 823. That assignment
Agreement never was recorded at the county recorder's office until Plaintiff Russell Johnson
caused to it be so first recorded in 1995, after the parties began disputing each other's storage
rights, and five years after Higleys recorded their purchase of the underlying land. R. at 558,
pp. 253-4; R. at 561, pp. 823-24; Tr. Exh. 11 (reproduced at Tab 3 of Addendum).
Johnsons contended at trial that Higleys are chargeable with notice of the assignment
Agreement by virtue of the following: (1) a copy of that Agreement was included as an
exhibit in the microfilmed records of the Third District Court of the 1950 litigation (Tr. Exh.
10), (2) that files of the dam safety section of the State Engineer's office contained the
originals of trial exhibit 18, the 1946-7 design plans for new proposed dikes, showing the
name of the reservoir to be formed thereby as "Wrathall-Johnson" (R. at 557, p. 157; Tr.
Exh. 18), a name also sometimes used to refer to the Blue Lakes by Johnsons, their cousin
Alan Johnson, and Cory Brown, a Grantsville resident who acknowledged that only people
in a little part of Grantsville knew it by that name, who also stated that most Grantsville
residents knew the ponds only by the name "Blue Lakes"( R. at 559, p.449), (3) that the
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policy of title insurance given to Higleys contained a standard exception for unrecorded
rights or claims, including easements, of persons in possession or claiming to be in
possession of the lands (Tr. Exh. 22), and (4) finally that a careful on-site inspection would
have shown that there was a water conveyance "structure" leading out of the most northerly
Blue Lakes to an extension of the west turn of the Fishing Creek irrigation ditch which
connects to ditches leading to the Johnson ranch, and that there was water flowing into and
out of the Blue Lakes in March, 1990.
Higleys responded at trial that constructive notice to them, who were not parties to the
1950 litigation, can only be given by documents recorded in the county recorder's office, not
documents on file elsewhere (R. at 562, p. 874), and that any 1990 on-site inspection only
showed, as Russell Johnson admitted, that the "watercourse" leading into the northerly Blue
Lake from the Fishing Creek ditch was only a swale or natural low depression in the ground
(R. at 558, p. 201), that the "sewer ditch" leading out of the northerly Blue Lake was only
a scar of an old, apparently abandoned ditch from decades before (R. at 559, p. 499), that said
"sewer ditch" connected to another ditch carrying Fishing Creek water to a variety of users,
including Johnsons (R. at 559, 562, pp. 499-501, 875), and that only by setting headgates in
a certain fashion would the water flow to the Johnsons as opposed to others. R. at 562, p. 875
Also, other long-time Grantsville residents, including Arthur Higley and his cousin Sherman
Higley, who was called by Plaintiffs to testify against Defendants Higley and was adverse
to Arthur and had a lawsuit then pending against Arthur (R. at 561, p. 814), knew the Blue
Lakes only by that term, and were not familiar with them being called the Wrathall-Johnson
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Reservoir. R. at 559, 560, pp. 497, 600.
However, even if one believes, as the trial court apparently did from its Finding of
Fact no. 49, that Higleys had actual or constructive notice in 1990 of the 1946 assignment
Agreement, none of that makes any legal difference if that Agreement was still legally
invalid, as an unenforceable attempt to sever a part of an easement appurtenant without
conveying any part of the dominant estate benefitted by the easement, and for other reasons
presented in Higleys' motion for summary judgment before trial, as explained in the
Argument below.
Arthur Higley's Discovery of and Objection to Johnsons' Use of Blue Lakes.
Arthur testified that he did not learn that the Johnsons were using Higleys' land to store water
in the Blue Lakes until he had a discussion with Russell Johnson on that point a year or two
after Higleys purchased the land. R. at 559, p. 518. When Arthur first learned that, he made
no immediate objection, trying to be a good neighbor to Russell and to help him. R. at 559,
p. 519. This continued until 1995, when Arthur refused to let him use it anymore because
of Russell's demands and threats. R. at 557, 559, p. 76, 520. In 1995 or 1996, a tug of war
between them began when alternately one would plug the hole in the dike to keep water in
the south lake, and the other would soon remove the plug. R. at 559, pp. 520-21.
The Higley Well Waters and Johnsons5 Claims of Flooding. The "Higley Wells"
are artesian wells which flow without pumping and which have flowed unabated year around
since the early 1950's. Defendant Arthur Higley owns only a 1/6 interest in the Higley
Wells, and the remaining ownership is held jointly by Sherman Higley, Rulon Higley, Lester
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Higley, Lynn Higley or his mother Lorna Higley, and Steven St. Clair. R. at 557, 561, pp.
47, 171-72, 748, & 814. The water from the Higley Wells runs into the "Higley Ditch"
which is owned by the owners of the water produced by the Higley Wells, the "Higley Wells
Association." Id.
Until the fall of 1996, the water ran in the Higley Ditch about three miles until it
passed the corrals, hay stack yard, chutes, and road which Plaintiffs claimed were damaged
by flooding to the location of the two headgates where the flow of the water could be
changed to divert the water for the use of Sherman and Lester Higley or into another ditch
owned by Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley, Steven St. Clair, and Lynn Higley. R. at 557, pp.
44-47; Tr. Exh. 14.
In the fall of 1996, a diversion ditch was constructed to allow the water from the
Higley Ditch to flow in the ditch across land owned by Steven St. Clair where it flows into
a new pipeline owned by Steven St. Clair, which runs across Plaintiffs' property pursuant to
an easement granted by Plaintiffs to Defendant Arthur Higley as well as to Rulon Higley and
to Steven St. Clair, and which at times is used by all six of the owners of the Higley Wells.
R. at 557, p. 52, 561, p. 770; Tr. Exh. 15.
In January and March of 1996, Plaintiff Russell Johnson testified that his corral and
hay stack yard were flooded by water from the Higley Ditch. R. at 557, 558, pp. 58-65,
267-79.
In late 1995 and early 1996, for about two months, Rulon and Arthur Higley put
Higley Well water into the South Blue Lake. R. at 561, pp. 671-72. This was done again
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in the summer of 1996 while Steven St. Clair's new pipeline was being put on Russell
Johnson's land. R. at 561, pp. 673-74, 764-65. In or about August, 1996, Rulon Higley
released the water stored in the Blue Lakes reservoir while Arthur Higley was on vacation
out of the state of Utah. R. at 561, pp. 676-77, 765-66 . There had been prior conversations
between Arthur and Rulon about their desire to use their Higley well water which they had
put in the Blue Lakes, but no definite direction was given by Arthur to Rulon to release that
water at the time and in the fashion it was. R. at 559, pp. 529-31. Russell Johnson claimed
that the water so released was all his, and that it consisted of at least 100 acre feet, because
the reservoir was half-full. R. at 557, 559, pp. 77, 80,129,424. There was no sewer effluent
placed into the Blue Lakes in the months of March, June, September or October, 1996. Tr.
Exh. 53. Arthur testified that just before he left on vacation, there was only one to one and
one-half feet in the bottom of the reservoir which could have later been drained out, and that
the lake was not half-full, but contained less than 100 acre feet and that none of the water so
drained out belonged to Russell because Russell had lost his water

when Russell

commingled his water with that of the Higleys without permission from defendants to use
the land for storing it. R. at 559, pp. 531-535.
Plaintiffs also claim and the trial court found that Defendant Arthur Higley alone is
liable for the damages from water which flowed onto their land during the winter of 19961997 from land of Steven St. Clair, when natural storm and winter runoff water, combined
with Higley Wells Association water being introduced into the head of the new pipeline
which was paid for and owned solely by Steven St. Clair, did not all flow into that pipeline.
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R. at 557, 561, pp. 69-72, 802-03. This claimed liability is based on Arthur's role in using
a hand held calculator to help determine the size of the pipe for that pipeline ( R. at 559, pp.
563, 568-70), notwithstanding that the trial court's site inspection in September 1997 showed
the pipe was accepting and carrying all the Association water from the Higley wells, and
ignoring the testimony of Arthur Higley that Rulon Higley helped size the pipe and that Mr.
St. Clair also independently sized the pipeline using his own computer program and had sole
veto power over how much he was willing and able to spend for that pipeline. R. at 559,
561, pp. 568-70, 763-64, 772-3, 808-09.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Wrathall's purported grant to Maxwell Johnson of a storage easement in the Blue
Lakes was legally ineffective and conveyed nothing. An appurtenant easement runs with the
land and is unassignable except as part of the transfer of the dominant estate. Indeed, an
appurtenant easement has no existence apart from the dominant estate and cannot be
separated from, or transferred independently of it. In 1946, Paul Wrathall was granted an
easement to certain lands in order to store water thereon. Mr. Wrathall then attempted to
grant a one-half undivided interest in his easement to Plaintiffs' father, Maxwell Johnson.
As he did not convey to Mr. Johnson any interest in the land to which this easement was
appurtenant, however, the grant fails as a matter of law.
Defendants were bona fide purchasers without notice, and were not subject to
Wrathall's purported grant of easement to Maxwell Johnson. A purchaser is considered
apprised of those facts obvious from inspection, but here there were no obvious indications
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of adverse use on the property sufficient to impose a duty of inquiry. Nor can Defendants
be charged with constructive knowledge of the purported grant, since it was recorded in
1995, five years after Defendants' purchase of the land had been recorded.
Plaintiffs cannot claim a prescriptive easement since they cannot show and have not
shown 20 years of open, continuous, and adverse use of Defendants' land under a claim of
right by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs' father's use began permissively. The
easement was an easement in land, not water, the only involvement of Defendants'
predecessors in interest being their consent that water be stored on the land; they had no
interest in the water's source nor its destination, and the fact that Wrathall sought to share
the stored water by attempting to convey an interest in his easement is entirely irrelevant to
the fact that the easement was permissive. Even if Plaintiffs' use had at some point become
adverse, they never asserted this adversity nor brought it to the notice of the servient estate
owners until 1995, when relations between Plaintiffs and Defendants first became strained.
Plaintiffs' use was neither open nor continuous. Plaintiffs' "storage" was nothing but
the natural accumulation of water in the Blue Lakes. This water spilled around the south
dike, into the North Lake, and thence down the scar of an old ditch and into the irrigation
system. If properly set, the headgates turned the water into a lateral ditch and so onto
Plaintiffs' land. Prior to 1986, however, when Russell Johnson applied with the State
Engineer's office for water-storage rights to the sewer effluent flowing out of the Grants ville
sewer lagoons, Plaintiffs had admittedly not used the Blue Lakes for many years. Between
some time prior to 1960 and Russell Johnson's 1986 application, there is no evidence that
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the Johnsons diverted any water into the South Blue Lake. Thus, for at least 26 years, the
purported easement was not being used at all. Plaintiffs' use has clearly not been continuous.
Plaintiffs cannot preclude Defendants from storing water on their own land. The
owner of a servient estate has all the rights and benefits of ownership, subject only to the
terms of the easement. Even if Plaintiffs had an easement, Defendants could still store water
in the Blue Lakes unless and until such storage displaces Plaintiffs' certificated water, filling
the South Lake and spilling Plaintiffs' water. The reservoir, however, has not been filled to
capacity since 1986 or earlier.
Plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. The trial court failed to set forth in its
findings the requisite specific facts and reasoning, demonstrating a careful balancing of
equities, leading to the clear conclusion that a party is or is not necessary or indispensable.
Relying instead on confused and irrelevant assertions in Plaintiffs' memorandum in
opposition to Defendants motion to join such parties, the court ignored the fact that
Wrathall's purported grant to Johnson was legally ineffective, the Wrathall easement had
passed to his successors, each of whom may now claim an undivided interest therein, and
whose interests have been seriously curtailed by the outcome below. In addition, the six
owners of interests in the Higley Wells all bear the same responsibility for the water in the
Higley Ditch, which allegedly flooded Plaintiffs' lands.
Arthur Higley cannot be held solely liable for the 1996-97 flooding. In the fall of
1996, a 20-inch pipeline was laid across Plaintiffs' land to carry Higley Well water to Higley
land, and to avert future flooding. Paid for entirely by Steven St. Clair, all aspects of the
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pipeline's construction were subject to his sole veto. For various reasons, beginning in
November of 1996, the water directed into the pipe overflowed onto Plaintiffs' land. The
trial court conducted a site inspection in September 1997 and found that the pipe accepted
and carried the entire Higley Wells flow, but Plaintiffs assert that the pipe was too small.
Arthur Higley was held solely liable for damages based on his sizing of the pipe. Mr. St.
Clair, however, also sized the pipe, and given his full veto power, Arthur Higley cannot be
held responsible for any overflow: on the contrary Mr. St. Clair was ultimately responsible
for its size, and the pipe is sufficiently large in any case.
In August, 1996, unknown to the vacationing Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley released
stored Higley Well water from the South Blue Lake to irrigate Higley land. Plaintiffs claim
that this water totaled some 100 acre-feet, and belonged to Russell Johnson. But Johnson's
water right permits him only 24 acre-feet per month, and unless he used no water at all for
four months, and none of it evaporated in the summer heat, he could not possibly have had
100 acre-feet in the South Lake when Rulon Higley released the stored water.
ARGUMENT
I.

PAUL WRATHALL'S PURPORTED ASSIGNMENT TO MAXWELL JOHNSON OF AN
INTEREST IN THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO WRATHALL BY DEFENDANTS 5
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST IS UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

A.

The 1946 Conveyance from Wrathall to Johnson Was Legally Ineffective.

As a general rule, "an easement can be used only in connection with the estate to
which it is appurtenant and cannot be extended by the dominant estate owner to property
owned by others unless so provided in the instrument by which the easement is created."
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Ridell v. EwelL 929 P.2d 30, 32 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). Accord Weber v. Johnston Fuel
Liners. Inc.. 519 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1974) (holding that the instrument creating the
easement at issue created an easement appurtenant which could not be separated from the
dominant estate; therefore, an attempt to convey the easement was "of no legal effect and
ineffective to convey any interest therein or title thereto."); Brown v. Voss. 715 P.2d 514,
517 (Wash. 1986) ("If an easement is appurtenant to a particular parcel of land, any extension
thereof to other parcels is a misuse of the easement." (citing Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto.
Wheaton. 220 N.E.2d 491 (111. App. 1966); Robertson v. Robertson. 197 S.E.2d 183 (Va.
1973); and Penn Bowling Rec. Ctr.. Inc. v. Hot Shoppes. Inc.. 179 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1949));
Luevano v. Group One. 779 P.2d 552, 554 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Kikta v. Hughes.
766 P.2d 321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) ("[A]n easement appurtenant... is deemed to run with
the land and is unassignable in the absence of a transfer of the dominant estate"); Burns v.
Alderman. 838 P.2d 878, 882 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (citing Nelson v. Johnson. 679 P.2d 662
(Idaho 1984)) ("An easement appurtenant must bear some relation to the use of the dominant
estate and is incapable of existence separate from it; any attempted severance from the
dominant estate must fail."); 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 103, p. 675 ("An
appurtenant easement cannot be separated from, or transferred independently of, the land to
which it is appurtenant.").
In Kikta v. Hughes. 766 P.2d 321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), for example, the Abrahams
granted an express easement to Gonzales, who owned a contiguous tract, in 1956. Ten years
later, the Abrahams deeded the southern section of their tract to the Hughes. Two years after
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this, in 1968, the Abrahams sold the remaining northern section of their land to the Kiktas.
In 1975, the Kiktas withdrew permission for the Hughes to cross their land. In 1982, the
Gonzaleses executed an assignment purporting to grant to Hughes "a permanent and
perpetual right of easement.... to the property now owned by Mildred Kitka [sic]." In
1983, the Kiktas filed a quiet title action. Hughes counterclaimed, arguing both actual and
constructive notice as well as prescription. The trial court quieted title in the Kiktas and
Hughes appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that "[tjhere must be unity of title in the
same person to both the dominant estate and the appurtenant easement claimed," 766 P.2d
at 323 (citation omitted), and that the Gonzaleses had not passed title to the dominant estate
to the Hughes along with the purported assignment of easement rights. Moreover, the court
pointed out, since the owner of the dominant estate cannot change the extent of the easement
as contemplated by the original grant, the owner of the dominant estate has no power to
convey the use of an easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another. Id.
(citing Stout v. Christian. 593 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Ricelli v. Atkinson. 132
N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); and Brooks v. Tanner. 680 P.2d 343 (N.M. 1984)).
In the present case, the two instruments creating the easement at issue—one from J.
Keith and Elba H. Brown and one from Penina W. Anderson, both attached hereto at Tab 2
of the Addendum—employ nearly identical language, and neither purports to create any right
in Mr. Wrathall to sever and convey his easement or any part or portion thereof to property
owned by another. The Brown easement, for example, declares as follows:
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J. Keith Brown and Elba H. Brown, his wife, grantors of Grantsville,
Tooele County, State of Utah, hereby give, grant and transfer to Paul E.
Wrathall, his successors in interest and assigns, Grantee, of the same place, for
and in consideration of the sum of $1.00, and other good and valuable
consideration, have granted, bargained, transferred and delivered and by these
presents do grant, bargain, transfer and deliver unto Paul E. Wrathall, his
successors in interest and assigns, an unconditional easement and right in and
to the following described real property in Tooele County, State of Utah, to
wit:
The Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter and the North
half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 29, Township 2 South,
Range 5 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, and the Southwest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 5
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres more or less, or
so much thereof as shall be necessary and convenient for the use
hereinafter set forth, but shall not exceed the natural reservior
[sic] basin.
For the purpose of storing water thereupon, giving and granting unto the said
Paul E. Wrathall, his successors in interest and assigns, the unconditional
easement and use of so much of said above described land as will be covered
and occupied by the storage of water therein and thereon, sufficient to contain
waters run thereupon the the [sic]2 natural course thereof, in storing said water,
together with the right of ingress and egress necessary for the full and
complete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted and
all rights and privileges incident thereto including the right to build, repair and
maintain said storage reservior [sic] basin.
This easement shall be in force and effect perpetually.
Undeterred by the fact that it was legally impossible for him to convey an interest in
his easement without conveying an interest in the dominant estate (i.e., his land), Mr.
Wrathall executed the Agreement of May 14, 1946, attached at Tab 3 of the Addendum,
purporting to grant to Maxwell A. Johnson "an undivided one-half interest in the easement."
The Agreement grants no interest in the lands owned by Wrathall, nor in any portion thereof.

2

The Anderson grant clarifies that this language should be "in the."

81776 HI321 002

32

Like the Gonzales easement in Kikta. the easement in the present dispute is clearly an
easement appurtenant, inasmuch as the original 1946 easement from the Browns and
Anderson to Wrathall was "created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in
his use of the land." Weber. 519 P.2d at 975 (quoting Restatement of Property § 453). Like
the Gonzaleses, Wrathall attempted to convey the easement, or in this case a one-half
undivided interest therein, without conveying title to the dominant estate to which the
easement is appurtenant. Such a conveyance must fail as a matter of law.
B.

Defendants Were Bona Fide Purchasers Without Notice.

It is well established that a purchaser will be charged with notice of an interest
adverse to his title when he is aware of facts which would lead a reasonably
prudent person to a course of investigation which, properly executed, would
lead to a knowledge of the servitude.
Methonen v. Stone. 941 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Alaska 1997) (numerous citations omitted). This
means, essentially, that "[t]he purchaser is considered apprised of those facts obvious from
an inspection of the property." IdL (citing various cases).
In the present case, however, a 1990 inspection of the property revealed no apparent
easement. Russell Johnson told no one he was storing water, and there was nothing there to
show he was. (See R. at 558, p. 224.) The Blue Lakes themselves, unchanged since the early
1950s save for some minor repair work in 1986, gave no evidence of an easement; the new
outlet pipe was under water and not visible; old diversion works were inoperable; the scar
of the old ditch, down which water naturally escaping from the lakes often passed anyway,
gave no hint of an adverse use. As the water reached the Fishing Creek ditch, it fed into a
network of ditches farther down serving more land owners than just the Johnsons. None of
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this was in any way new or different or out of the ordinary, and inspection of the property
thus revealed no "facts obvious" enough to impose a duty of inquiry. And indeed, the last
Arthur Higley had heard, Wrathall had stopped using the water around 1950 because it was
too alkaline. Thus, far from having reason to believe any easement existed in Plaintiffs,
Arthur Higley had express reason to believe the contrary to be true.
Of course, a purchaser, whether of land or of water, may also be considered to have
had constructive notice under the recording laws. See Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-2(1)
Under Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3, an unrecorded document "is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent
purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and (2) the
subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." The purported grant by Wrathall
to Maxwell Johnson was not recorded until 1995, five years after the recording of the
conveyance to Defendants' of the land containing the Blue Lakes.
Plaintiffs assert, however, that Defendants were on notice because the WrathallJohnson Agreement was in the Third District Court archives as part of the records of the
1950 lawsuit, or because the State Engineer's files contained the 1946-47 proposed dike
plans. As to the former assertion, Defendants were not parties to that suit, and cannot be
charged with notice thereof, to say nothing of the exhibits offered in connection therewith.
The latter assertion is irrelevant: Utah law imposes no duty to check the State Engineer's
files for evidence suggesting the possibility of water storage easements when purchasing
property.
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The only mechanism by which Plaintiffs could have put Defendants on constructive
notice was the Tooele County Recorders Office—a mechanism which they failed to use.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT USED DEFENDANTS9 LAND OPENLY, ADVERSELY, OR
CONTINUOUSLY, LONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION.

A party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that his use of another's land was
open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. Valcarce
v. Fitzgerald. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 70 (Utah 1997) (citing Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah
22, 197 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948)). The claimant must prove the necessary elements by
clear and convincing evidence, Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (citing Garmond v. Kinnev. 579 P.2d 178, 178 (N.M. 1978)), but the use will be
presumed to have been adverse if the claimant can show open and continuous use under
claim of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period. Valcarce. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70
(citing Zollinger v. Frank. 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1946)). However, this
presumption cannot arise "under mere use by a licensee and knowledge of such use on the
part of the licensor." Green v. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing
Lunt v. Kitchens. 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953)). Use, moreover, cannot be construed as
adverse "when it rests upon license or mere neighborly accommodation," id (citing Lunt,
260 P.2d at 538); see also Griffiths v. Archibald. 272 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1954) (Wade, J.,
dissenting).
In Green, for example, which concerned the legal status of an irrigation ditch running
across four contiguous parcels of land, one Howard Miller and his father, who owned one
of the parcels, dug the ditch in 1947 or 1948 with the permission of the adjoining
81776 HI321002

35

landowners. They also extended the ditch to convey their excess water across the land of one
Harold Jensen to another parcel owned by the Millers. This parcel was later conveyed to the
Stansfields.
Mr. Jensen's heirs sold his parcel to a Mr. Green, who built a pond to collect the water
flowing across his land so as to water his cattle. His pond, however, prevented water from
flowing through the irrigation ditch to the Stansfield parcel. Mr. Stansfield allegedly entered
Green's property with a backhoe and breached the pond. Green filed suit, seeking damages
and an injunction to prevent the Stansfields from entering his land and interfering with the
water in the pond. The Stansfields counterclaimed, asserting that they had a superior right
to the water and requesting the declaration of an easement across Green's land. Green,
however, argued that an easement could not arise because Green's predecessor in interest,
Harold Jensen, had granted permission to the Millers to dig the ditch across his land, and
without adverse use, there could be no prescriptive easement. The trial court granted Green's
motion and the Stansfields appealed.
Affirming, this Court cited various cases from other jurisdictions, explaining that
[wjhen a party's use of property is permissive at its inception, the use cannot
ripen into a prescriptive right unless there is a later distinct assertion of a right
hostile to the owner, which is brought to the attention of the owner, and the use
is continued for the full prescriptive period.
Green. 886 P.2d at 120 (quoting Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610 P.2d
1149, 1152 (Mont. 1980), and citing City of Anchorage v. Nesbett 530 P.2d 1324, 1329
(Alaska 1975) and Scheller v. Pierce County. 104 P. 277, 278 (Wash. 1909)). "The
proponent of a change from permissive to adverse use," this Court explained, "must assert
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such a right to the owner. Without such an assertion, adverse use cannot arise." Green. 886
P.2datl21.
A.

Plaintiffs' Original Use was Permissive.

It is important to note that the easement granted to Paul Wrathall in 1946 was an
easement to some 160 acres of land. The easement is not a grant of water, but of land upon
which to store water. Paul Wrathall was granted a right to use certain land upon which to
store his water while not in use. Plainly, Mr. Wrathall's use of this land was permissive.
Unaware that it was legally ineffective, Mr. Wrathall gave to Maxwell Johnson an
undivided half interest in this easement interest. That the Browns and Anderson knew of this
purported assignment is a matter of record: they were named defendants who appeared and
were represented by counsel in the 1950 case of Castagno & Johnson et al. v. Wrathall et al.
(Civil No. 3559), in which the Agreement between Wrathall and Johnson was introduced as
an exhibit.
The Browns and Anderson, in other words, permitted a certain amount of water to be
stored on their land "not [to] exceed the natural reserv[oi]r basin." Whence the water came
to the burdened land, so long as it was "run thereupon [in] the natural course thereof," was
not important. Whither it went was the affair of Paul Wrathall. The headgate which must
be turned to direct the flows to either Wrathall's land or Johnson's was located on property
which belonged to a third-party; the Browns and Anderson had nothing to do with what
happened to the water once it left their land, and Mr. Wrathall's willingness to share with
Maxwell Johnson, evidenced by a written document shared with and not objected to by the
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original owners of the servient estate, shows that Johnson's use of the storage right was
permissive.
A simple illustration: let's say that X tells his neighbor Y, the owner of the house next
to his, that Y can park a lawnmower in X's garage. Y lets his neighbor Z use the
lawnmower. Y moves away, and gives Z the lawnmower. Z might continue to keep the
lawnmower in X's garage without objection for many years, but he can hardly claim that the
original parking of the lawnmower in X's garage was nonpermissive: under the rule set forth
in Green v. Stansfield. the use of the garage "cannot ripen into a prescriptive right unless
there is a later distinct assertion of a right hostile to the owner, which is brought to the
attention of the owner, and the use is continued for the full prescriptive period." 886 P.2d
at 120.
Similarly, turning back to the present dispute, Plaintiffs never made any "distinct
assertion of a right hostile to the owner," nor have they brought any such assertion "to the
attention of the owner" nor even intimated any such claim until Arthur Higley protested
Russell Johnson's change application to clear up a mistake on his Fishing Creek water in
1995 (Record at 557, p.76). And it was not until shortly thereafter that Mr. Higley began
repeatedly to plug the hole between the two dikes which Mr. Johnson repeatedly removed.
There can, in other words, be no showing of actual adversity until at the earliest 1995. Prior
to that, since the easement's inception in 1946, any water storage had been permissive.
B.

Plaintiffs9 Use of Blue Lakes Has Not Been Open and Continuous for 20
Years, So the Presumption of Adversity Cannot Arise.

The evidence does not support the trial court's finding of open and continuous use for
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the required 20 year period.
Although the fact that Plaintiffs' father's use of the easement began as a permissive
use precludes any claim of an easement by prescription, Plaintiffs have also failed to show
that their use of the easement, or their father's use, was or has ever been either "open" or
"continuous" for the requisite 20 year prescriptive period.
To establish an easement by prescription, the owner of the servient estate must
actually know of the use of the purported easement and the claim of right under which it is
used or the use must be so visible and open, so "notorious" that "in the exercise of reasonable
diligence the owner should learn thereof." Jensen v. Gerrard. 39 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah
1935); cf McGill v. Wahl. 839 P.2d 393, 397 (Alaska 1992); 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and
Licenses" § 60. Here, however, although Defendants' predecessor in interest knew of Paul
Wrathall's purported grant to Maxwell Johnson of a 50% interest in Wrathall's water-storage
easement, there is little if any evidence that anyone knew or saw that it was being used. And
indeed, as Russell Johnson himself admitted, for "many years" it had not. (See Tr. Exh. 23.)
Following the 1950 litigation, the south dikes were constructed, impounding what is
now the South Blue Lake. The dike impounding the water in the North Blue Lakes washed
out at some point prior to 1960. In 1986, Russell Johnson applied with the State Engineer's
office for water rights to the sewer effluent discharging out of the Grantsville sewer lagoons
and flowing into the South Blue Lake. But between the south dike construction and the north
dike failure prior to 1960 and Johnson's 1986 application, there is no evidence of any kind
that the Johnsons diverted water from any source into the South Blue Lake. Russell Johnson
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apparently diverted Fishing Creek water through the North Blue Lakes basin once or twice
to "flush them out," but the only water flowing into the South Blue Lake between the time
prior to 1960 and the mid-1980s was natural runoff.
Even if Plaintiffs' father had used the Blue Lakes for water storage continuously from
1946 all the way through 1960, the latest date when diversion into the Blue Lakes evidently
ceased entirely (a period of not more than 15 years), this would not satisfy the 20-year
prescriptive period. And Plaintiffs' alleged use herein, even if it had run without ceasing
from 1987 (when Russell Johnson's application was approved) through the present (a period
of about 12 years), would likewise not satisfy the prescriptive period. There is, moreover,
a gap of at least 26 years between Maxwell Johnson's purported use (1946-60) and
Plaintiffs' (1986-98).
Whatever else it may be, Plaintiffs' use clearly has not been continuous. Neither has
it been "open." Plaintiffs' "storage" between 1960 and 1986 consisted entirely of the natural
accumulation of ordinary runoff. Plaintiffs did nothing at all to actively "store" any water
in the Blue Lakes. They diverted no water, nor did they release any. The water accumulated
by act of God in the South Blue Lake simply spilled around the dike on the South Lake and
flowed into the lower North Lake basin, thence into the scar of the old ditch and into the
Fishing Creek irrigation ditch north of the Blue Lakes. From there, assuming the headgates
were set properly, the water flowed down into Plaintiffs' land.
Such use is hardly "open"; indeed, it is hardly even "use." Making use of water which
just happens to be flowing in your direction anyway cannot give rise to a presumption that
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one is actively diverting, storing, and releasing water from a storage easement. The evidence
simply does not bear out a finding of open, continuous use for the required 20 years.
Plaintiffs have no prescriptive easement.
C.

Plaintiffs' Right to Store Water in the Blue Lakes, If Any, Cannot Operate
to Deprive Defendants ofAll Storage Rights, and the Trial Court Exceeded
its Discretion in So Ruling.

Plaintiffs' interest in the Blue Lakes, if any, cannot preclude Defendants from storing
water on their own land. The owner of a servient estate "has all the rights and benefits of
ownership consistent with the easement; the right to use the land remains in him, without any
express reservation to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the purpose and
character of the easement." Wykoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758-59 (Utah 1982) (citing 25
Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 89 (1966) and North Union Canal Co. v. Newell. 550
P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976) ("the owner of the fee title, because of his general ownership,
should have the use and enjoyment of his property to the highest degree possible, not
inconsistent with the easement.... the owner of the easement should likewise have the right
to use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the rights
of the fee owner.")).
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs may have an easement interest in the
Land upon which the Blue Lakes are situated, Defendants may nevertheless store water from
the Higley Wells in the Blue Lakes and use that water as well as natural runoff into the Blue
Lakes unless and until such storage displaces the water therein which Plaintiffs claim to have
stored within the limits of Plaintiffs' certificated quantity.
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In other words, to forestall Defendants' storage of Higley Well water in the Blue
Lakes, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the addition of the Higley Well water has somehow
displaced the approximately 24 acre-feet per month to which Russell Johnson's water right
entitles him. Of course, this could only happen if the addition of the Higley Well water
actually filled the South Lake entirely, spilling out Plaintiffs' water (as well as all other water
therein). The South Blue Lake, however, has not been filled to capacity since 1986 or even
earlier, and has occurred not once since Defendants began diverting Higley Well water into
the Blue Lakes. Plainly, therefore, Russell Johnson cannot have been deprived of his 24
acre-feet per month by the addition of the Higley Well water.
As the owners in fee of the land upon which the Blue Lakes lie, Defendants have the
right to use their land as they see fit, so long as the use is legal and does not interfere with
Plaintiffs' easement (if such there be). Defendants' ability to place water into the Blue Lakes
cannot be precluded by Plaintiffs' purported easement unless and until Defendants' water
depletes Plaintiffs' storage space. As this has never occurred, Defendants retain the right to
use the Blue Lakes for storage of the water from the Higley Wells.
III.

APPELLEES JOHNSON FAILED TO JOIN VARIOUS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

Rule 19(a) & (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure3 imposes a two-part analysis

3

19(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
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for determining whether a party be indispensable: First, "[p]ursuant to subsection (a), 'a
court must first determine whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the action to
make it a necessary party,' considering the criteria set forth in the Rule." Seftel v. Capital
City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Manvgoats v. Kleppe. 558 F.2d
556, 558 (10th Cir. 1977)). As set forth in the rule, these criteria are whether,
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 19(a). If a party is deemed necessary, the court must then apply the
analysis set forth in subsection (b) of the rule, to determine whether the party is sufficiently
"necessary" to be "indispensable." This second analysis consists of four factors:
(1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence will
prejudice him or her or those already parties;
(2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective
measures or provisions in the judgment;

of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. . . .
(b) If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party,
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping
of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
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(3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in the person's
absence, and
(4) the adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
Utah R. Civ. Proc, Rule 19(b). Taking each of these factors into account, the court must
determine "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed . . . or should
be dismissed." Id
A Rule 19 analysis requires the trial court to discuss in its findings "specific facts and
reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under rule 19(a) or
indispensable under rule 19(b)." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (citing Manygoats v. Kleppe. 558
F.2d at 559). Failure to do so is error, id, although such an error may be harmless "if, upon
a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion."
SefteL 767 P.2d at 945 (citing Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987) ("The
findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" "Failure of the
trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the
record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.' (citations omitted)).
In the present case, the trial court denied the Higleys' motion to join certain parties
as indispensable without discussing or even alluding to specific facts and reasoning as to
either prong of the required analysis: necessity or indispensability. The findings state merely
that
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the court concludes that the nature of the claims set forth in plaintiffs'
complaint do not require joinder of additional parties. This action grows solely
out of the alleged conduct of defendants. Plaintiffs seek no relief against
anyone other than defendants.
(Record at 436-37.) The order ends with a reference to "the reasons set forth in plaintiffs'
memorandum in opposition to said motion," but the Plaintiffs' memorandum is neither
summarized nor outlined. But indeed, even if such a reference is permissible, Plaintiffs'
memorandum is insufficient.

It confuses easement with water-right, claiming that the

"Wrathall joint interest in the easement appears to be owned by no one inasmuch as plaintiffs
are the only recognized water storage right holder, according to the State Engineer's records"
(Record at 77); it ignores the existence of joint interest in the water from the artesian flows'
on Defendants' land; and it dismisses as irrelevant the fact that Plaintiffs' claim to the waterstorage easement must affect the interests of the true owners of the easement, the successors
in interest to the land whereto the easement appertains. Plaintiffs' memorandum simply
concludes that "plaintiffs seek no relief against anyone other than defendant Arthur Higley"
and declares that "[i]f there is someone else out there, so be it. The judgment in this case will
not bind them or prejudice their claim." The former assertion is irrelevant, since whom
Plaintiffs seek relief from has no bearing on who must be joined; and the latter assertion is
wrong.
In any event, Utah law is quite clear that "abstract generalizations are not a substitute
for the analysis required under Rule 19." SefteL 767 P.2d at 945 (citing Provident
Tradesmen B. & T. Co. v. Patterson. 390 U.S. 102, 124 (1968)). And the trial court's
findings are in fact mere abstract generalizations which fail to examine the elements required
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for a determination of whether other parties may be necessary or indispensable. Certainly,
the findings show none of the careful balancing of equities leading to the clear conclusion
that the action might in good conscience proceed.
In light of the inadequacy of the findings below, this Court must examine the record
to determine whether the clear evidence supports the trial court's conclusion. SefteL 767
P.2d at 945. Since WrathalFs purported conveyance to Maxwell Johnson of an undivided
half interest in his easement was legally ineffective, the easement granted to Paul Wrathall
by the Browns and Anderson in January of 1946, necessarily passed to those to whom
Wrathall conveyed the land to which the easement is appurtenant. See, e ^ , Universal Motor
Fuels. Inc. v. Johnston. 917 P.2d 877, 881-82 (Kan. 1996); Kikta. 766 P.2d at 323; Nelson.
679 P.2d at 664; 25 Am.Jur.2d "Easements and Licenses" § 104. The members of this group
may each claim an undivided interest in the entirety of the easement, including the 50%
claimed by Plaintiffs under the ineffective conveyance. The interests of these individuals
have clearly been unfairly curtailed by Plaintiffs' failure to join them, since their interest in
the whole easement has essentially been eliminated by the rulings of the trial court. Even
though Cory Brown, as a witness in open court, stated he was willing to abandon any interest
he may have had in the easement, there was no determination made as to what portion of
WrathalFs interest had passed to him, and another of Wrathall's successors, Rulon Higley,
claimed in court that he desired to preserve his interest in the easement, notwithstanding he
had only recently learned that he had any right to claim such an interest. In any other action
which may be brought by those who own the land to which the easement is appurtenant,
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Defendants' land may well be subjected by a decision in another court to a greater burden
than was either granted or contemplated by the original grant of easement.
The various holders of undivided interests in the water of the Higley wells—Arthur,
Rulon, Sherman, Lester, and Lynn or Lorna Higley, and Steven St. Clair—are likewise
indispensable parties. The water in the Higley Ditch, which allegedly flooded Johnson's
lands, including the corral and haystack yard, belongs to and is the undivided responsibility
of all six joint owners of an interest in the canal and the water therein. No one owner has any
greater duty to Plaintiffs than have the others, nor does any have severable liability to
Plaintiffs apart from the other owners. And indeed, Plaintiffs' counsel admitted in closing
argument that "we did not prove that Mr. Higley was—that the defendant was the sole
responsible party for this first flooding event. . . . that's something we just failed to prove."
(R. at 562, pp. 870-71.)
In addition, on most occasions that Plaintiff Russell Johnson complained of flooding,
the water was not being used by Defendants. In January of 1996, it was Lynn Higley's water
turn; in March of 1996, it was Sherman Higley's water turn; and in August of 1996, it was
Sherman Higley's and Lester Higley's water turn. (Record at 84; Tr. Exh. 13.) The other
owners of interest in the Higley Ditch and its water remain liable to suit and possibly to
inconsistent results on this same issue.
The trial court also held that Defendant Arthur Higley is liable for damages to
Plaintiffs' land which occurred between November 1996 and summer of 1997 when water
from storm and winter runoff, and Higley Association water did not all enter the new pipeline
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(paid for and owned entirely by Steven St. Clair), and flowed instead onto Plaintiffs'
property. Arthur Higley's liability is based solely on his having helped determine the size
of the pipe. Mr. St. Clair, however, had independently sized the pipeline and had full control
over the financing of the project. How Arthur Higley alone can equitably be held wholly
liable for these damages is nowhere explained in the record.
Plainly, under a Rule 19 analysis, nonjoinder of these parties left Mr. Arthur Higley
and others "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of [the] claimed interests]" of the several unjoined parties.
IV.

T H E EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING THAT DEFENDANT
ARTHUR HIGLEY IS SOLELY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE 1996-97 FLOODING.

In the fall of 1996, a diversion ditch was constructed to carry the water from the
Higley Ditch across Steven St. Clair's land and into a 20-inch pipeline (laid in August 1996)
which runs across Plaintiffs' land pursuant to an easement granted by Plaintiffs to Steven St.
Clair, Rulon Higley, and Arthur Higley. One purpose of the diversion ditch and pipeline was
to avert future flooding of the sort of which Plaintiffs had complained. (R. at 557, p. 52.)
The material for the pipeline and its installation were paid for entirely by Steven St. Clair (R.
at 559, p. 576), who had, as a result, sole veto power over all aspects of construction. All
three of the easement holders—Arthur Higley, Rulon Higley, and Steven St. Clair—worked
out solutions as to the appropriate size of the pipeline. Arthur Higley's calculation was made
on a hand-held calculator, Mr. St. Clair's via computer program. Subject entirely to Mr. St.
Clair's veto, both solutions indicated a 20-inch line would more than suffice, and a 20-inch
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line was put in across Plaintiffs' land.
During the winter of 1996-97, storm water, natural runoff, and Higley Wells
Association water, flowing through the diversion ditch, did not all enter the pipeline and the
excess flowed on Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs assert that the pipeline was sized too small for
the anticipated load from the Higley Wells. The trial court, however, conducted a site
inspection in September 1997, and found that the pipe sufficed to accept and carry the entire
flow from the Higley Wells.
No evidence, in other words, suggests or demonstrates that Arthur Higley was
responsible for any overflow. His sizing of the pipeline was supplementary to Mr. St. Clair's
own careful, computer-assisted review, and was subject entirely to Mr. St. Clair's absolute
veto. In any event, however, the pipeline was and is sufficient to carry all of the Higley Well
water without difficulty. The trial court abused its discretion in holding Arthur Higley solely
liable for any damages connected with the 1996-97 flooding.
V.

DEFENDANT ARTHUR HIGLEY DID NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS' PURPORTED
EASEMENT NOR DID H E CONVERT PLAINTIFFS' WATER TO HIS OWN USE OR
ALLOW IT TO RUN TO WASTE.

For two months beginning in December of 1995, and again in July of 199,, Higley
Well water was stored in the South Blue Lake. In August of that year, while Arthur Higley
was vacationing with his wife in Yellowstone, Rulon released the stored water to irrigate
Higley land. Arthur Higley did not instruct Rulon to release the water, nor did he know until
his return that it had been released.
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Russell Johnson claims that the water released was all his, and that it consisted of at
least 100 acre feet. Actually, however Russell Johnson's water right entitles him to only
.39cfs, which equates to approximately 24 acre-feet per month. Russell Johnson's claim that
there were 100 acre-feet in the South Blue Lake which all belonged to him would require that
the only source of the water be the sewer effluent from the Grantsville lagoons, that only 24
acre-feet per month pass into the South Blue Lake, that four summer months pass without
any evaporation whatsoever, and that Johnson had not used any of his allotment for the
duration of those same four months. Needless to say, these premises border on the absurd.
In essence, Plaintiffs assert, and the trial court agreed, that Defendant Arthur Higley
is responsible for the release of water that wasn't Plaintiffs' because someone else released
it without Arthur Higley's knowledge while he wasn't even in Utah.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the decision of the trial court be
vacated, declaratory judgment be entered in favor of Defendants determining that Plaintiffs
have no easement, either by grant or prescription, to store water on Defendants' land, and
that the Defendants owe no damages to Plaintiffs for any flooding suffered.

In the

alternative, the Court should order the claims of Plaintiffs dismissed for failure to join
indispensable parties. In the further alternative, the case should be remanded for a new trial.
DATED

this IS

4ft5miK. Mangum
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(J

ScottM. Ellsworth
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

day of July, 1998, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief

of Appellant were mailed by first class mail, U. S. Postage prepaid, addressed to
Marc Wangsgard
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
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ADDENDUM
Tab 1

Contract for Deed by and between the Farm Credit Bank of Omaha and Arthur
Stephen Higley and Susan M. Higley, Husband and Wife.

Tab 2

Grant of Easement between J. Keith Brown and Elba H. Brown, Grantors, and
Paul E. Wrathall
Grant of Easement between Penina W. Anderson, Grantor, and Paul E.
Wrathall.

Tab 3

Agreement between Paul E. Wrathall and Carrie Wrathall, his wife, and
Maxwell A. Johnson, purporting to grant to Johnson a one-half undivided
interest in the Wrathall Easement.

Tab 4

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered September 9, 1950,
Castagno & Maxwell Johnson et al. v. Paul Wrathall et al.. Dist. Ct. For
Tooele Co., Case No. 3559.

Tab 5

Correspondence between Russell Johnson and Robert L. Morgan, State
Engineer.
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CONTRACT FOR DEED
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this ^rnj^
1990,

day of tpt-m^^

.

by and between FARM CREDIT BANK OF OMAHA hereinafter reierred to as

SELLER, and ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY AND SUSAN M. HIGLEY, Husband and Wife,
as Joint Tenants with full right to survivorship, hereinafter referred to
as PURCHASER:
WITNESSETH:
That SELLER hereby agrees to sell to PURCHASER and PURCHASER
hereby agrees to purchase and pay for the property described in Exhibit
"A" and located in Tooele County, Utah:
TOGETHER WITH all improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging,
including all water rights, including but not- limited to the following
vater rights as evidenced by the State of Utah Water User's Claim numbers
15-27S7,~15-328, 15-330, 15-1262, 15-1307, 15-331, and 15-411.
7u u*lf >" -** '\

V

•• * 3-i'

SUBJECT TO property taxes and assessments for the year 1990 and
subsequent years; to exceptions.and reservations contained in patents
fro:r. the United States and the State of Utah; to all reservations,
exceptions, zoning restrictions and covenants, if any, and ail
easements and rights of vay actual or of record cr that may be apparent
upon inspection of the surface.
(Hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY) upon the following terms and
conditions:
1.

PURCHASE PRICE.

The purchase price for the PROPERTY is TWO

HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/IOOTHS (£225,000.0&) vhich PURCHASER
promises and agrees to pay to SELLER as follows:
a.

S16. 000.00 previously paid by PURCHASER, receipt of vhich is
hereby acknowledged by SELLER; AND

b.

s51,500.0O paid by PURCHASER concurrently with the signing of
this contract by SELLER and PURCHASER, receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by SELLER; AND

c.

The remaining principal balance of S157,500.00 will be paid as
follows: F0UR<4) annual principal payments in the amount of
S7,e75.00 plus interest, vith the first annual principal and
interest payment being due on the first of May, 1991, and a like
sum due the first of May for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994.
THEN A FINAL BALLOON PAYMENT ON THE FIRST OF EK>OG*vfcrrr, 1995 IN
THE AMOUNT OF $126,000.00 PLUS INTEREST.
'>**<? J- 7" - #- . ~ ' .
Interest on the.unpaid principal balance will accrue at the rate
cf Ten CIO/1) percent. p&~ snnu^i, and all interest payments viil
be due on the first of May of ea^h year. Interest starting date
for all unpaid principal shall begin on March 1, 1990.

d.

Said annual payments shall be applied first to the payment of
all accrued interest then to the remaining unpaid principal
balance as of the date of each such annual payment, and applied
thereafter to the reduction of the principal balance due
hereunder.
MflfiK
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e.

PURCHASER shall have the WJ^^ASgS^tP;/ prepay any amounts under
this contract any time, • ^ ^ ^ e n a l t y ^ v i t h such additional
payments applied first to penalties and interest and then to
reduce the unmatured principal balance oved hereunder.

f.

PURCHASER shall pay to SELLER a late payment penalty on all
delinquent payments equal to Two percent (2.C%> per annum above
the said contract interest rate and shall be conputed on the
total past due amount from the date the payment vas due until
the past due payment is made. Said late payment penalty shall
be due at the time it is incurred and payable immediately.
Failure to pay said penalty at the time it is incurred shall
constitute a default hereof.

2.

POSSESSION.

PURCHASER shall be entitled to enter into

possession of the PROPERTY at closing and to continue in
possession unless and until default is made under the terms
hereof.
3.

DEED.

Upon payment in full by PURCHASER of the purchase

price and accrued interest as herein provided, SELLER agrees to convey
the PROPERTY to PURCHASERS, by Deed or Deed vith Special Warranties.
4.

TITLE INSURANCE.

Within 30 days of the execution of this

agreement, SELLER vill furnish to PURCHASER e Title Insurance Policy
in the amount of the purchase price.

In the event PURCHASER'S

finds

defects in said title, SELLER, after written notice thereof, shall
endeavor to have the same cured to the satisfaction of the PURCHASER,
vithin a reasonable time.
5.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

PURCHASER shall provide SELLER annual

financial statements in a form acceptable to SELLER vhen requested by
SELLER during the term of this Contract.
6.

TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS.

Property taxes and assessments for the

year 1989 and prior years shall be paid by SELLER.

PURCHASER to

pay all property taxes and assessments thereafter.

If PURCHASER fails or

refuses to pay any such taxes and assessments during the term hereof,
SELLER may pay the same and the cost shall then be added to the purchase
price and shall bear interest at the same rate, and Ehall be secured by
the terms of this Contract.

Provided further, PURCHASER'S failure to pay

such taxes and assessments vhen due shall be deemed a default under this
Contract.
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7.

ASSIGNMENT.

PURCHASER shall not sell, assign or convey

PURCHASER'S rights hereunder or to the PROPERTY without the prior
written consent of SELLER,

Such consent shall not be unreasonably

withheld.
S.

ESCROW.

The Federal Land Bank Association of the Midlands, in

Casper, Wyoming, is hereby mutually nominated to act as Escrow Agent
hereunder.

SELLER covenants that SELLER will execute and deliver to the

Agent a good and sufficient Deed or Deed with Special Warranties
conveying said PROPERTY to PURCHASER, PURCHASER consents that PURCHASER
will execute and deliver to Agent a Quitclaim Deed for the PROPERTY
executed by PURCHASER in favor of SELLER.
At such time as the PURCHASER shall have made all the payments due
hereunder and shall have fully performed all other covenants on
PURCHASER'S part to be made and performed, then and in such event, the
Agent is authorized to deliver both DEEDS to PURCHASER.

In the event of

a default in the terms of this Contract by PURCHASER, then Agent shall
file and record the Quitclaim Deed in favor of SELLER.

All payments and

billings will be handled directly between PURCHASER and SELLER.
9.

CONDITION OF PROPERTY.

PURCHASER acknowledges that he has

carefully examined the PROPERTY and they are purchasing the PROPERTY
including any irrigation equipment in an *AS IS, WHERE IS" condition,
with no implied or expressed warranty or warranties by SELLER or its
agents.

The execution of this Agreement by PURCHASERS will be deemed as

acceptance of the PROPERTY in all respects.
10.

REPAIRS, MAINTENANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS, AND CARE OF PREMISES.

PURCHASER shall keep the premises, including all farmground, in as good
a condition as the same are now and shall make all repairs to any
improvements required to maintain them in such condition.

SELLER

reserves the right of inspection of the premises at any reasonable time
to insure compliance with this provision.
11.

DEFAULT AND REMEDIES.

The parties agree that TIME IS OF THE

ESSENCE of this Agreement, and the failure on the part of PURCHASER to
keep and perform any of the conditions herein provided for or failure to
make any payments hereunder within 30 days after the duty to perform such
conditions arise, or after such payment or payments become due, shall
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constitute a default.

After said 30 day default period, PURCHASER shall

have an additional ten (10) days, after vritten notice has been sent to
them by SELLER notifying them of such default, vithin vhich to correct
such default.

In the event PURCHASER fails to correct the default vithin

said ten (10) day period after vritten notice has been sent to
PURCHASER, then such failure to correct the default shall vork in a
forfeiture of this Agreement, and the SELLER shall have the right to take
immediate possession of the PROPERTY and terminate all of the PURCHASER'S
rights hereunder.

SELLER shall have the right to possession of the

escrowed documents and all payments made by PURCHASER hereunder shall be
retained by SELLER as liquidated damages and rental for the use of the
property.

If SELLER so elects, SELLER shall have the right to institute

legal proceedings to recover damages for the breach of the terms of this
Contract for Deed and for all damages incurred as a result of the default
by PURCHASER.

The rights of the SELLER in enforcing SELLER'S rights

hereunder are cumulative and are in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies provided by lav.

In any event, the SELLER shall be entitled

to possession of the property and the rents and profits thereof from and
after any such default, time being of the essence.
In the event of litigation, the unsuccessful party agrees to pay all
reasonable costs of the successful party, including but not limited to,
attorney's fees.
12.

MECHANICS' L1EK AND SUPPLIERS' LIEKS.

During the term of this

Agreement, PURCHASER vill not knovingly allov any Mechanics' Liens or
Suppliers' Liens to be placed on the PROPERTY.

If any liens are placed

on the PROPERTY, PURCHASER vill be deemed to be in default of this
Contract if said liens are not removed in full, vithin five days of lien
being filed.
13.

NOTICE:

Notice required under this agreement shall be mailed

to the folloving address, as notice to all PURCHASERS, by certified mail:
TO BUYER:

ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY
SUSAN h. HIGLEY
487 EAST 2400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115

TO SELLER: FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION OF THE MIDLANDS
P.O. BOX 900,
CASPER, WY 82602

Ccs/J
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Copies of any notices to SELLER shall be delivered concurrently to:
FARM CREDIT BAKK OF OHAHA
206 SOUTH 19TH STREET
OMAHA, NE 68102
The mailing of any such notice or demand to the SELLER or the PURCHASER
at their respective addresses set forth above shall be deemed
sufficient service thereof.

If there is more than one SELLER or

PURCHASER hereunder, the mailing of such notice shall be deemed to be
sufficient service on ail such SELLERS and PURCHASERS respectively.
Copies of all required notices shall be sent to the escrov agent.
The ten (10) day period PURCHASER has under this Agreement to correct
any written notice of default, shall begin upon receipt, by PURCHASER,
of said written notice.

In the event PURCHASER fails to collect and sign

for said written notice, the notice shall be considered as having been
received three (3> days following the deposit of the same in any United
States Post Office by SELLER.

Change of address for notice may be made

by giving appropriate notice in vriting of such change to the other party
and to the escrov agent.
14.

DIVISION OF EXPENSES FOR THIS TRANSACTION:

The parties agree

that the expenses in connection vith the sale and purchase of this real
estate will be divided as follows:
a.

Attorney's fees, if any, for the drafting of this Agreement:
SELLER

b.

Title insurance premium: SELLER

c.

Title corrections:

d.

Recording expenses:
(I) Contract for Deed: Split 50/50 between SELLER and PURCHASER.

e.

Credit application fee:

15.

GOOD HUSBANDRY:

SELLER

PURCHASER shall pay by separate check
at time of closing, in the amount of
$1,575.00.

PURCHASER will farm said premises through

the term of this agreement in a manner consistent vith sound agricultural
practice of the community in which the same are located

and will not

commit or suffer waste thereon, nor shall PURCHASER overgraze any of the
pasture land contained in said premises.
16.

ENTIRE AGREEMENT.

This agreement contains the entire

understanding of the parties.

There are no representations, warranties,

promises, covenants or undertakings other than thost' expressly set forth
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herein.

Mo modification or vaiver °* a ^y of the terms of this Agreement

shall be valid unless in vriting af*d executed with the same formality as
Ko waiver of any t?rea^h hereunder shall be deemed a

this Agreement.

vaiver of any subsequent breach or default of the same or a similar
nature.

The failure of any party

to

upon the strict performance of any

insist in any one or more instances

o £

*he terms or provisions of this

Agreement on the part of the other party to be performed, shall not be
construed as a waiver or relinquisnroen*t * o r the future of any such term
or provision.

The same shall cont* n u e

tn

*ull force and effect. Ko

vaiver or relinquishment shall be tfeemed to have been made by either
b vt h e

party unless in writing, duly signed

party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands to
this Contract for Deed this 3™U

,. day of

772-*^.^A-^

, 1990.

SELLER:

PURCHASER:

O^^yjA^^ ^d\t^L^\

J^^J^_

ARTHUR STEPKEN^KIGLEY

FARM CREDIT BANK OF 0«AHA
by Fedeisl Land Bz
of^tfyomlngy its a
Ln-fact.
RON &. YOUNG ~
Assistant Vice

SUSAN H. HIGLEY

STATE OF }lAM
) 8E.

O-JUSAJ^—

COUNTY

The foregoing instrument vas acknovfedaed/'Before me by ARTHUR STEPHEN
HIGLEY AND SUSAN M. HIGLEY, this 2— dafr A£ 'y>UuJ, , 1990. Witness by
hand and official seal.

\f/jL^l

Notary Public
My commission expires:^

STATE OF WYOMING

)

COUNTY O F NATRONA

>

NOTARY PUBLIC
PETER K. ELLISON

ijj^jm.

One South Main Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
My Commission Expires

December 19.19S2
_g*ATgOFUTAH

) 68.

(,& day of y?)/iAsA^
_, 1990, before me, a Notary Public,
personally appeared Ron L. Young, t o m* k n o v n l 0 b * the person named
herein and vho executed the foregoing instrument, and vho did svear that
he is Assistant Vice President of the above named Federal Land Bank
Association; that the instrument « a s signed on behalf of the Corporation
by authority of the Board of Directors; and acknowledged the execution of
the instrument to be the voluntary act and deed of the corporation and of
gr.t^a^vdg^^to^aop^e^ecAited by the corporation and the agent voluntarily.
On t h i s

I ELLEN M. SARVER . Norary Public" {

C o ^ Of ^
\

N«ron.
c

s&a /

S:3,e Of

Vu

N S*4i£l(^-

( g $ *WnB

*****r

, /jA

, •

M /UJ

^

PubXlc

y My owmiare^ionFv-e»x^ifcjeg:
(6)
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EXHIBIT "A"

TOWNSHIP 2 ^
SECTIOH 8:

SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AMD MERIDIAN
E1/2SEI/4

SECTION 9:

SW1/4, lees railroad right-of-way

SECTION 16:

Wi/2, NV/1/4HE1/4, less 4.96 acres or railroad
right-of-vay

SECTION 17:

N1/2KE1/4

SECTION 20:

SW1/4SW1/4, W1/2SE1/4, El/2SV?l/4» W2/3W1/2NE1/4,
E1/2SE1/4

SECTION 21:

Wl/2

SECTION 26:

The eastern 1023 feet of the HE1/4NW1/4.
Beginning at the NW corner of Section 26,
thence east along section line 1717.7 feet to
Grantsville City line? thence south along said
city line 1320 feet to south line of NE1/4NV1/4;
thence vest 1717.7 feet to section line? thence
north along section 1320 feet, to the point of
beginning, containing 52.05 acres, more or less.

SECTION 29:

NE1/4, E1/2HE1/4NW1/4

STATE 0* I T ^

)

<<t

COUNTY CF TOOELE ) SS
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY Of
THE DOCUMENT THAT APPEARS OF RECORD IN
MY OFFICE.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL
otfi

THISX-DAY OF

-^Gfltr.niher

^

\%dJ

DONNA S. McKENDRICK
JWELECOUNTYRECOROER

BY

7¥k/l//rf7S

1/!/777k?S?

DEPUTY

Tab 2

Dated t h i s 1 1 t h day of F e b r u a r y ,

1946.

By t h e C o u r t .
C.E. H e n d e r s o n
D i s t r i c t Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH,

)
) ss.
) .

County of Tooele.

I , David S a n k h e a d , C l e r k o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e S t a t e of U t a h , - i n and
f o r T o o e l e C o u n t y , do h e r e b y C e r t i f y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s a f u l l , t r u e and c o r r e c t copy o f t h e
O r i g i n a l O r d e r C o n f i r m i n g S a l e o f R e a l P r o p e r t y , i n t h e n a t t e r o f t h e e s t a t e o f G e o r g e ' s . Remingt o n and D a i l y E. R e m i n g t o n , h i s w i f e , d e c e a s e d ,
a s a p p e a r X s o f r e c o r d and on f i l e
A.D.

V/ITNESS t h e C l e r k o f
1946.

i n my o f f i c e .

said Court,

with the seal

thereof a f f i l e d ,

David B a n k h e a d
Clerk.

(SEAL)

t h i s 7 t h day of ^ a r c h ,
/s/

#220950
R e c o r d e d a t t h e r e q u e s t of U. E a r l M a r s h a l l , i l a r c h 7 - 1 9 4 6 ,

a t 3:35 P.II.

EPH

COUNTY RECORDER
-EA5EJEMT-

? El IN A '#. ANDERSON, GRANTOR, o f NORTH UOLLYvVOOD, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, h e r e b y
G i v e s , g r a n t s and t r a n s f e r s to PAUL E. V/RATHALL,4 h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , GRANTEE,
o f G r a n t s v i l l e , T o o e l e C o u n t y , U t a h , f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e sua of $ 1 . 0 0 , and o t h e r good
and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h a v e g r a n t e d , b a r g a i n e d , t r a n s f i x e d nnd d e l i v e r e d and by t h e s e p r e s e n
do g r a n t , b a r g a i n , t r a n s f e r and d e l i v e r u n t o PAUL E. V/RATHALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and
a s s i g n s , an u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a s e m e n t and r i g h t i n and t o t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d r e a l p r o p e r t y i n
T o o e l e C o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h , to w i t :
The N o r t h v / e s t q u a r t e r o f t h e S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r and
t h e n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of southwest q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n
2 0 , Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 West, S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n ,
c o n t a i n i n g 30 a c r e s more o r l e s s ;
f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s t o r i n g w a t e r t h e r e u p o n , g i v i n g and g r a n t i n g u n t o t h e s a i d PAUL E. WRATH ALL,
h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a s e m e n t and u s e o f so jiuch of s a i d
a b o v e d e s c r i b e d l a n d a s w i l l b e c o v e r e d and o c c u p i e d by t h e s t o r a g e of w a t e r t h e r e u p o n ,
sufficien
to c o n t a i n w a t e r s run t h e r e u p o n i n t h e n a t u r a l c o u r s e t h e r e o f , i n s t o r i n g s a i d w a t e r , t o g e t h e r
w i t h t h e ri.c;ht o f i n g r e s s and e g r e s s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e f u l l and c o m p l e t e u s e , o c c u p a t i o n and
e n j o y m e n t o f t h e e a s e m e n t h e r e b y g r a n t e d and a l l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o i n c l u d i n g
t h e r i g h t to b u i l d , r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n
s a i d s t o r a g e r e s e r v o i r o r o t h e r u s e of s a i d w a t e r .
This easeuont

s h a l l b e i n f o r c e and e f f e c t

D?ited t h i s 1 s t day o f i J a r c h ,

perpetually.

1946.

Signed in n r e s o n c e of:

P e n i n a \7. A n d e r s o n

/ s/

3 T A T E 0 r 0 .-\L 1.0 RN IA
Co M :: t y o f '^0 5 An z c-1 e s
On t h e 1 s t d a y of March, A.D. 1 9 4 6 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me, P e n i n a V/. A n d e r s o n ,
s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me t h a t s h e e x e c u t e d t h e same.
( N o t a r i a l Seal)
.ay c o m m i s s i o n e : c p i r e s :
iiy c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s Mar.
#220944
Recorded at

G e r a l d i n e E. P u g h / s /
NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary P u b l i c
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f Los A n g e l e s ,
of C a l i f o r n i a
t h e r e q u e s t o f P a u l E. " r a t h a l l , Mar. 6 - 1 9 4 6 , a t 2 : 3 0 P.M.
28,

the

1949.
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State.

EASEiENT
J . KEITh BROl/N and ELBA H. BRO\/N, h i s v / i f e , GRANTORS o f G r a n t s v i l l e , T o o e l e C o u n t y , S t a t e
o f U t a n , h e r e b y g i v e , g r a n t and t r a n s f e r t o PAUL E. WRATriALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s ,
CPANTEE, o f t n e s a i e p l ^ c e , f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e sum o f £ 1 . 0 0 , and o t h e r good and
v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h a v e g r a n t e d , b a r g a i n e d , t r a n s f e r r e d and d e l i v e r e d and by t h e s e p r e s e n t s
do g r a n t , b a r g a i n , t r a n s f e r and d e l i v e r u n t o PAUL E. V.'RATnALL, h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and
a s s i g n s , an u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a s e m e n t and r i g h t i n and t o t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d r e a l p r o p e r t y i n
T o o e l e ^ o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h , to w i t :
The N o r t h w e s t q u a r t e r o f t h e N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r and
t h e North h a l f of t h e N o r t h w e s t w a r t e r of S e c t i o n
29, Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 West o f t h e S a l t L a k e
M e r i d i a n , and t h e S o u t h w e s t Q u a r t e r o f S o u t h e a s t
Q u a r t e r and S o u t h e a s t Q u a r t e r o f S o u t . i w e s t Q u a r t e r
o f S e c t i o n 2 0 , Township 2 S o u t h , Range 5 W e s t , S a l t
L i k e M e r i d i a n , c o n t a i n i n g 160 a c r e s more o r l e s s , o r
so much t h e r e o f a s s h a l l b e n e c e s s a r y and c o n v e n i e n t
f o r t h e u s e h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h , but s h a l l n o t exceed
the n a t u r a l r e s e r v i o r basin.
F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s t o r i n g w a t e r t h e r e u p o n , g i v i n g and g r a n t i n g u n t o t h e s a i d PAUL E. WRATHALL,
h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t and a s s i g n s , t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l e a s e m e n t and u s e o f so much o f s a i d
aDove d e s c r i b e d l a n d a s w i l l b e c o v e r e d and o c c u p i e d by t n e s t o r a g e o f w a t e r t h e r e i n a n d t n e r e o n ,
s u f f i c i e n t to c o n t a i n w a t e r s run thereupon t h e the n a t u r a l c o u r s e t h e r e o f , i n s t o r i n g s a i d w a t e r ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t n e r i g h t o f i n g r e s s and e g r e s s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e ' f u l l and c o m p l e t e u s e , o c c u p a t i o n
and e n j o y m e n t o f t h e e a s e m e n t h e r e b y g r a n t e d and a l l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o i n c l u d i n g t h e r i r n t t o b u i l d , r e p a i r and m a i n t a i n s a i d s t o r a g e r e s e r v i o r o r o t h e r u s e o f s a i d w a t e r .
This easement

snail

be i n f o r c e and e f f e c t

D a t e d t h i s 15 d a y o f J a n u a r y ,

perpetually.

1946.
J . K e i t h Brown
/ s/
E l b a K. Brown / s /

ATTEST:

ST'iTE Of UTAH
COUNTY OF TOOELE

)
)
)

ss.

On t h e 1 5 t h d a y o f J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 6 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me, J . K e i t h s r o w n and E l b a
K. Brown, h i s " i f e , t h e s i g n e r s o f t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d to me t h a t t . i e y
e x e c u t e d t h e same.
iiv c o m m i s s i o n e : : o i r e s :
J u l y 5, 1946
( N o t a r i a l Seal)

J . Allen Parkinson
/s/
Notary P u b l i c , r e s i d i n g
G r a n t s v i l l e , Utah

at

/T'220945

Recorded a t

t h e r e q u e s t o f P a u l E. V . ' r a t h a l l , d a r . 6 - 1 9 4 6 ,

a t 2 : 3 1 P.M.

EPU

COUNTY RECORDER
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
J U ; 5 COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
u

In t

1

- Ll^ttc * o-

IRVTi hlLLU^N,

the E s t a t e oi

DECREE ALLO'./INC FIRST AND FINAL

Deceased.

ACCOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF
RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE AND DISCHARGING THE ADMINISTRATRIX AMD
IE^LASI.JG

4J

f

.-ONDSUIJ.

Now comes E l l e n 0 . F r e d e r i c k s o n , f o r m e r l y i - l l e n 0 . H i l l m a n , a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f t h e e s t a t e o f
t h e a b o v e named d e c e d e n t , by h e r a t t o r n e y C.N. L e a t h e r b u r y , and p r o v e s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f
t h e c o u r t t h a t h e r p e t i t i o n f o r t h e a l l o w a n c e o f t h e f i r s t and f i n a l a c c o u n t o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t r i x and f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e r e s i d u e o f t h e e s t a t e and t h e r e l e a s e o f h e r bondsmen was
f i l e d on t h e 2nd d a y o f F e b r u a r y , 1 9 4 6 , and t h a t t h e c l e r k o f t h i s c o u r t , o n F e b r u a r y 5, 1 9 4 6 ,
a p p o i n t e d t h e 1 8 t h day o f F e b r u a r y , 1946 f o r t h e n e a r i n g t n e r e o f and t h a t d u e and l e g a l n o t i c e
of" t h e t i m e and p l a c e o f h e a r i n g was g i v e n a s r e q u i r e d by l a w and by an o r d e r o f t h i s c o u r t ; and
s a i d p e t i t i o n b e i n g now p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s c o u r t , and no p e r s o n a p p e a r i n g t o c o n t e s t o r o b j e c t t o
the sane, the court a f t e r hearing the evidence, being s a t i s f i e d t h a t a l l d e b t s l i s t e d a g a i n s t
t h e s a i d e s t a t e a r e t r u e and c o r r e c t , and t h e same a r e h e r e b y a l l o w e d and a p p r o v e d , and r e c e i p t s
f o r t h e same h a v i n g been f i l e d h e r e i n , and t h a t a l l t a x e s upon t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e s a i d e s t a t e
h a v e b e e n p a i d , t h a t n o t i c e to c r e d i t o r s was d u l y p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Times News of N e p h i , U t a h ,
and a d e c r e e o f due and l e g a l n o t i c e t o c r e d i t o r s h a s been s i g n e d and f i l e d h e r e i n , and t h a t
t h e t i n e f o r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f n o t i c e t o c r e d i t o r s h a s e x p i r e d , and t h a t t h e f u n e r a l e x p e n s e s
and e x p e n s e s o f t h e l a s t i l l n e s s o f t h e d e c e a s e d h a v e b e e n p a i d i n f u l l a n d t h a t a l l m a t t e r s
a p p e a r i n g upon t h e r e c o r d s h e r e i n a r e t r u e , and a r e h e r e b y a p p r o v e d and f o u n d c o r r e c t , and t h a t
s a i d e s t a t e i £ now i n a c o n d i t i o n to be c l o s e d .
STATE OP iTW
) ss
And i t b e i n g shov.n t o t h e i t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t t h a t saQ&jtW&fc&F&OE&lrix i s c h a r g e a b l e
w i t h e s t a t e a s s e t s a s f o l l o w s , t o Wi t :
, H e R 6 B Y CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
THE DOCUMENT THAT APPEARS OF RECORD IN
MY OFFICE
THISX-DAY OF
DONNA S McKENORlCK

Tab 3

I
A 0 R £ K M B » !T
THIS AGREEMEIT

mada and antared Into at Orantarilla, Tooala

County, 8tata of Utah, on tha / ^ ^ d t y of May, 1946, by and batwaan
PAUL E. WRATHALL and CARRIE WAATHALL, hi§ wifa, of Orantrrilla aforeaaid,
Firat Partial, and

MAXWELL A. J0HI80I

of Orantarilla aforaaaid, Saaond

Party,

WHEESA8

tha partiaa harato ara tha ownara of tha right to tha usa

of a portion of tha watara of Fiahlng Craak in Tooala County, ttata of Utah,
and hara panding in tha Offioa of tha Stata Bnglnaar of tha Stata of Utah
applioatlona to atora a portion of tha wintar watar of aaid w)c
raaarrolr harainaftar vtwr^d

in tha

to and to uaa tha watar that atorad at a

latar tin* upon thair raapaotira nearby landai and
WHEREAS

Firat Partiaa hara upon tha following landt, to wits

tha wfr of tha SSfc, tha •} of tha Stfc and tha fl£ of thaflttof taction 10,
tha iwi of tha Ili and tha H

of tha lt$ of Saatlon 19, Twp. t South,

tango 6 Haat# Salt Laka Bata and Vtittlan, an aaaaitant antitling than to
araot, aonatroat and Maintain upon aaid land r9Bwroir&

or dltahaa and hara

haratofora oonatruatad upon aaid land haralnbafora daaorlbad a dika or dam
in tuoh aumtr aa to form upon aaid pranitat a raaarroiri and
WHEREAS

it ia tha datlra of Saoond Party to aoquirt from Firat Partiaa

an aqual intaraat with than in aaid aaaamant and aaid raaarrolr and tha right
to atora watar in aaid raaarroiri
MOW THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY A0KESD BETWBBR

tha partiaa harato aa

followai
1»

That tha Firat Partiaa do haraby gira and grant unto tha Saaond

Party, hla haira, tuooaaaora and aaalgnt, an undlrldad ona-half intaraat in
tha aaaamant upon aaid pramlaas* togathar with an undlrldad ooa-haLT lnteraat
in and to aaid dika or dam, and an undiridad ooa-half intaraat in tha right
and pririlaga of atorlng watar in tha raaortolr araatad by at id dam, to tha

end t)iat the Firut Parties and Second Party shall be entitled to the
benefit, use and enjoyment of it id easement and reaerroir in all reapeota
ahare and share alike*
2.

The Second Party agreee to pay Firat Partiea for tha one-half

lntaraat hereby eesigned the sua of

OWE TH0U8WD 1W0 HUIDRID AID FORTY

DOLLAR8 (11,240.00), payable aa follows! Six hundred and twenty dollara
($620*00) payable in oaeh on or before sixty (60) days from tha data of
this Agreement and tha balanoe of 8ix hundred and twenty dollara (#620.00)
on or before 2 year a from tha data hereof, tha unpaid balanoe to baar
lntaraat at tha rata of 4 & par annum* and firat Partiea ahall have and are
hereby given a vendor'a llan upon aald eaecnent, raaarroir and intereata
hereby a a signed to —pwrm tha payment of aaid unpaid pureL»»? *riae and
in tha arent of foreoloeure of aald llan and a dofUionoy Saaond Party
agreee to pay auah dafiolanoy and Saaond Party agreee to pay aliooata,
imolading Attorney*a fooc, in tha forealoaure of aald llan or tha collection
of aaid amount aftar ita maturity^
*•

XT IS tniMHUTOOO

between tha partias hereto that tha dike or

dam above rafarrad to oroaaaa tha Ilfc of tha Stfc of taatlon 10, Tap, and
langa aforesaid, la auoh manner at *o ancloee in aald raaarroir approximately
one aara of land in aaidffJ&of tha Sffc of Saotion 20 and that tha Firat
Partiea, although in poeeeeeion of aald W»i of tha S*i of Saotion 20 do not
hare an aaaaaant for tha oonetraetlon and aaintananaa of aaid dike and tha
ineluelon of aald aara of ground, mora or lea a, within aald raaarroir, and
it la agreed bataaan tha partiea hereto that by purchaaing an undivided
one-half lntaraat in aald dike and aaaamaata and raaarroir tha Saaond Party
ahall not be and become liabla for damage to tha Wf£ of tha 8*£ of Saotion 20
and tha First Parties agree that thay will forthwith uaa their beat effort a
to aoqulre tha propar right or aaaaaant for tha oontinuad maintenance of
aaid dike In ita praaent location and that thay will pay auoh reasonable
amount aa may be neeeeeary to acquire that right and tha right to tha uaa
of approximately tha one aara of ground encloaed In aaid reaerroir, and that

*« b^twoen the parties hereto the Firat Parttet will tare the 8eoond Party
hermleae on aooount of the oririnal conatruotion of aaid dike and the
including of approximately one tore of ground in eaid reeerroir,

And it

ia further agreed between the partiea hereto that in the erent Firat Partiea
oannot aoquire the right to oontinue the aaid dike and reeerroir in ite
preaent looation orer the aaid N*} of the SWj of aaid Seotion 20, they will
realign eaid dike or dam ao that the a a me ia entirely upon land embraoed
within the eaeement of the Firat Partiee.
4«

IT 18 AORSKD

between the partiea hereto that from and after

the date hereof they will pay ehare and ehare alike all ooete of meintenanoe
and improvement of teid reeerroir or any enlargement thereof*
6*

It ie oomtemplated between the partite hereto that they will

eaoh etore equal emounte of water In aaid reeerroir and that they ehall
eaoh be entitled aquelly to withdraw from eaid reeerroir at auoh time* ae
they nay eererally aleot the water to whioh they are entitled, but if for
any reeeon either party hereto ahould fail to divert Imto and itore in
eeid reeerroir ae puoh water aa the other party m y divwrt and atore In
eaid reeerroir, then the amount of water etored la eaid reeerroir thall be
dlrided In proportion to the reepeotive amounte the partiee hereto hare
reapeotirely diverted and plaeed in eaid reeerroir.
6.

It ie underetood between the partiea hereto that the eaeementa

whioh Firet Partiee hare inolude more land than ie ooverei by the preeent
dlk* and reeerroir and that t^ie Aealgnaent oovere only the eaeement in the
landa upon whioh aaid dike and reeerroir are looated, and partieularly that
Firyt Partiea r^mrre

the aree within the lande held by eaeement north of

aaid reeerroir for the purpoae of oonetruoting and maintaining north of aaid
rieervolr an irrigation ditoh or dltohee.
n WIT9CS8 WHSKK0F

the partiee hereto hare hereunto eubeeribed their

n**m§ the day and year firet above written*

3TATI OF UTAH

)
) SB

OOOTTY OF T00EL8 )

On tha

/y

day of Ifcy, 1946, paraoaally appaarad bafora ma

PAUL I. URATEALL and CARBZI WRATIALL, bis wif## and K4XWBLL A. J0HX8Q*,
aifnara of tha foragoing laatrtu*ttt# who duly aokaowladgad to w
thay axaoutad tha aa»a.

H««idia« la
My Comiaaion axpiraa,

IV, '0 ."1;

\1

'

^

•"

"^~~.>

^
*'^v^-/

\

* fft*h.

that

Tab 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—-00O00——

J . J . CASTAQNO and EDITH CASTAONO, h i s
w i f e , CHARLES H. TTDRTKINQTON and ANNIE
B. WORTRTHOTON, h i s w i f e , ' SAMUEL H.
WORTHTNOTON and LIBBI B . WCETHINOTON,
h i s w i f e , IRENE W. PAGE, MADELL A .
JOHNSON and ERKA JOHNSON, tala w i f e ,

Plaintiffs,

F1KDIBQS OF FACT AKD

PAUL E. !RAIHALL,*nd
his wife, B O T H
hie wife,

SXXW05LC&S OF Ugr

QUUSH
and BLANi
BROWgand
LAfBENOE
wife,
JOHEBCfj
Al*x Jehnaoa^
ABDERSON,
iDifeadants'.

court, vlth the Honorable J* eUlan. Crockett,l#»dge .thereof presiding, on the 5th
day of April, 1950, the plaintiffa and dafeadante hating appeared by aad through
their respective attorneya, and the court having heard the eridenoe adduced,
nor enters its Findings of Feet and Cenclueions of Lars
FIHDIHOS OF FACT
1. That the defendanta Mile 0. Higley and Blanche Higley, hie wife,
by and throng their attorney of record, E» LeRoy Shielda, stipulated at the
eewaeneeaent of the trial that their rights vera Junior and inferior to the
rights of all the other plaintiffs and defendants aad that they would be en*
titled to no water unless there waa water eurplua to the rights of the other
plaintiffe and defendants*
Z.

That all of the plaintiffa and defandante, Paul X* trathall and

Carrie trathall, his wife, Keith Brtra and lira Brown, hia wife^ frdnten i r o n

"Come now the parties through their respective attorneys of
record and stipulate as follows:
"1* That J. J. Castagno and Edith Castagno, his wife, ere
the oimers of and are in possession of the following described lands in Tooele County, State of Utah:
The northwest quarter of 8ection 21, Township 2
South, Range 5 West, S.L.B. & M., containing 160
acres.
"2. That Charles H« Worthington and Samuel H. Worthington
are co-partners and ara tha owners of and are in poaaeaaion
of the following daaoribad lands In Tooele County, State of
Utaht
The East § of the Southeaet quarter of Section 8;
the Souttweet quarter of Section 9} the Xortlvaat
quarter, of the Jjharthsaat quarter and thi weet half
i f flection 16, ^ p s Hor^Ktlf V the Hortheast
5 Wset, Salt^L^^Baee; and Meridian, containing
approximatel^6&0 acrea.
•3. Ihat b a n e % Pagejfr-thi
cribed land I n Tooele County,

of.the following deeof TJtaht

Beginning at a point 98 feeV.Bast fro» Southveat

thence
acres*
"Ihat eaid laada »f Irene Y # Page were leaaed to J. J* Castagno and Edith Castagno, hia wife, on April 21, 19U8, for a
tern of 5 years, and the aaid Castagnos wt% in possession
thereof*
B

U. That Maxwell k. Johnson ia the owner of n d is in the
poaaeaaion of the following described land in Tooele County,
State of Utah:
The North half of tha Hortisrest quarter of Section
20, in Townahip 2 South, Range 5 West of the Salt
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. Also the South
half, the South half of the Hortheast quarter, and
the Southeast quarter of the Hor threat quarter of
Section 17, in Townahip 2 South of Bange $ West of
tha Salt lake Meridian, containing U80 acres.
"5# That Paul trathall ia tha owner and ia in poaaeaaion
of the following daaoribad laada in Tooele County, State of
Utah:
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Thi Northeast quarter and the South half of Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 2
South! Ranee 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Ner1
containing 21*0 acres.
"6* That Penina W* Anderson is the owner of the following
described lands leoated in Tooele County, Statu of totalis
The Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and
the Kortteeet quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 20, Township 2 South, Bangs 5 lest, 8. L*
B* 4 M. | containing 80 aires*
•7* Thit toith Brown andiMj
sad J s ^ ^ A ^ ^ ^ t a i ^ p- i a r i
the lands dsscribedin'r
answer end oemtorelaia*
•JB. That oolyiwte^Dl

^^ -^j-iSjulnten Brown
?«re in possession of
" thedefendants'
of the parties
.usive, of this
age of the lands
eaoh of the parties

is as fellowet

•(a)

,MciMmm^^m^^mmt^m

(b) rI^|^^i!iMS|5Si^»Jt^» ^ww^r***™?^^™ - • .-• • •
(o) i t o l f c a t h ^ • • . . . . * . . - . . . . - (d) Penina ¥• Anderson • •
•••
(e) Maxwell MBMuit duu^^di^ij^A^ii^iyi
(f) ttithrBrown^^
and Jack Brown • ; . * * * * . .
(g) Samel H« and Charles H* Worthington

102*0
125.7$
29*50
192.5
76*00

«W» Irrigation* « ,
Salt Qrassunder
Irrigation
*
-*..Ditches tost only occasionally irrigated
"That in addition to the above the defendants Brown olain
the right* ae is set forth in paragraph 36 of their iiiewei
and counterclaiM to use water on tte Kortfavest half of tte
Hartteast quarter ml tte lortheast qmsrter of tte Hortteeet
quarter of Section 29 at sooh tines as tte otter parties are
harvesting their hayj that plaintiffs deny this claimed
right} but i t i s agreed that this stipulation on irrigated
acreage is without jnrejxw^
Browns.*
/Rertles did not agree to paragraph 9 of tte stipulation as
filed^
•10* « » ^ i * ^ ^
to&nm^
on or about tte 1st
day of March of each year and extend* to tte let day of Borenter of eaoh year *

- h-

"11* That the agreement which is attached to the answer
and counterclaim of defendants Brown and Wrathall, and vhich
is martedExhibit B, (said agreement covering the right to
use water during the winter tims from November 1st to Uarch
1st) is an executed agreement and should be adopted by the
court in Its decree as fixing the rights to use the waters
of Three Kile or Fishing Greek during the period from November 1st to the following March 1st of each year.
•12 • Siat on March 28th, the water table underlying the
lands described in paragraphs 1 to 7 f inclusive, was tested
at H U M M U S points, and that on the high knolls the ground
water was a V ^ p place more than 2 feet from the surface;
that in thafiwilas the water table or ground water was at
eurfeoe levil.
•13. B a t ; r « p worked Exhibit «A"f showing the lands

Sdp/Sdl

» & But
intheplai
deseribod
It say bo

s correctly portrays land owneradmitted in evidence*

^^•rltl.pbotogriph'of tht'l«nd8 described
oorr»otly portryg tba^a>M.dmy*hj^he
itonraap abowlnjt the alepe of^tbe lands
IMrrtet oontoar nip of thtcarea, that
' *,t »D» and admitted in eridence.

•17* that defendant Mil* 0. Hijley tOaA Application 17839
en or about Maroh 15, 191*6, in tht office of th» State Snflnter, and la now tat owner tbaroof•
•18. that dtfeadaftt Paul 1. Vratnall filed Application Ho.
17062 In tht effiat of tht State toginetr on or about tha 20th
day of UmN&$$3M$$ and that aald defendant ia the owner
theraaf. aift^tj^ititnr, to^htJroriaSon of the agreement which ial^kwd ftdiibit
ia^mttachi'
__ . »B«jahd
»^JtoiiSjttaoha4.'to
the
fit defend^ trathall.
<U,i fehnaon filed Applicatioft Ho. 1705°
v'the StetTlnxineer cTo7aboui tha 19th
Bomvwwr, w'^ww?|rvnMHM JadfljBibli "BVrtdeh ia attached
to tha oowterolAln of ^afattdant wrathall.
"20* That Charlaii B* lorthlagton and Saanal B. Worthiafton, Morrla I . *»athall^ Iraoe Face, and Robert Lawrence
filed Appllnatlnn 18359 In tha office of tha State Engineer,
and that J. J. Caatagno and Bdith Gaatapo, Ida wife,
soeoeedad to tte interett of Morrla I . trathall thtrainj
that aald partita and 4, J* Caatafno and Idlth Caatafno
are tht evaer* thereof, wafeject, however, to tha provision*
of Exhibit nf, Trt&cb U attached to tht anaaxar and coanUrelaln of defendant wrathall.

M

Dated ^uo 1st
Edward t.. Clyde
Attorney for Plaintiffs ™ "
Eliae Hansen
_
Attorney for defendants Paul E.
ftrathall, Carrie ftrathall, Keith
Brown, Elra Brown, Quinten Brown,
Jack Brown, Dona Brown and Penina
IT. Anderson"
«

That the facts recited 'in said"Stipul" *»

i ,Tih above, art: found by •

the court to be true*
**

M agreed ty all of the parties that there \*» u» ?TJ

in the acreage ehown to Penina IT, Anderson and Pa\^

Wraths

stipulafeton^iio^

.'of irrigated ground

and Paul E. WrathaU to h a v e l i n ^

i 11 1.1.1 ii

Penina W. Ander

son's g r o u n d ! ^

£• Wrathall's

ground whic^ M r i ^

be so amended*

been two natural ^prlxif^
^3fiToiTOlP^f9«^t8

Utahf that the

waters issuing from said two springs flow in a northwesterly direction and c
minglf

pur

in section line which is common to Section 33 and 28.

2 South, Range 5 lest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
stream and channel which is known ae Fiahinf ^~»*
tributed from natural sources
described abov,' m
Fishl'ip

1

*

.^-a .

t

only wate

unnamed sj** aige along the cnarme*; t u ;

« ' ' flyiiiacti stream with a mora mm less constant flow*

owned by the plaintiffs awl defendant
unless the lands ar«
km «'(

* * *-

a contributed by the two springy

$• That all of the lands described »

t

>

IIPIF

.

upuxation as b e L ^

,,, 1 Mru uliftiui,y alkaline; that

* alkaline :salts are 4*ehed from the lands,
valuable for the raising*of crops; tt*t

:

to the lands to wash the alkaline salts from them durl
wall'as during the other seasons; that

, s \mt

,,.s.
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tha plaintiff a and dafandantaHrathall, Brora* and Anderson and ihair pradaoaasor
owners of tba tracts of land described in the stipulation above hare diverted
watar from Thraa Hila or Fishing Craak and haya appliad tba saw to tha irrigation of tbalr respective lands; that all of tba waters of Fishing Craak have
been used by the plaintiff a and said defendants; that aaid use has bean benef i c i a l to tha growing of crops) that i t i s beneficial to tha growing of crops
to divert and use watar aa early aa March 1st and to continue the use of the
ssae until October 31st of aaoh year* and for aare than sixty fire years last
paat tha aaid parties hate *o used the watar) that beginning in approj±aately
1930 tha plaintiff a or thsir jaredeoees^a ^

the defendants Brora,

'***

Wirathall and Anderson, or^theJr

**

»v* t

oontraot to govern the i » ,of ^

in intereet, antared Into aa oral
v

1

j&&

waa reduced to writing, but tha wilting
or their predaoaaaorai

assanca of aaid oral contract
arrar aifnad by any of tha parties
aa manif airtad by aaid writing,

provided aa followat

JAMES
^wuainjM^/partiaa of the first
P^^l A X B Weaam^M
PfflftlS JOBBSOW, parties of tba
eeond part) WCBIHIHOT0H BpOTHKES, partiaa of tha third
partj and WILLIAM L. BOOTH, party of tba fourth part,
all of QrantaviUa, Tooele County, state of Utah, WITNESSETH:
_

"THAT WHEREAS the partiaa of tha first part are tha owners
of certain real property deecribed aa follows:
The Northwest quarter offlection21, with tha
exception of 9k0 ffcet on tha South aide of
aaid Quarter Section) tha East one-half of
Section 20) tha South one-half of tha Xorthwest Quarter of Section 20, and tha Southwest
Quarter of Section 20, all in Township 2 South,
Range 5 West/ Salt Lake Baas and Meridian.
"AMD WHEREAS tha partiaa of tha second part are the owners
of certain real property described aa follows, to wit:
All of Section 17, and the Xerttoeet Quarter
of the Borttsreet Quarter of Section 20, both
in Toanahip 2 South, Bangs £ Weat, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian*
•AMD 1HBREAS ti» partiaa of the third part are the owners
of certain real property described aa follewa, to wit:

The Weet one-half of Seotlon 16j the Northwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 16;
The Southwest Quarter of Section 9; the East
Quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 8;
and the North one-half of the Northeast Quarter
of Section 17, all in Township 2 South, Range
5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian .,
* AND WHEREAS the party of the fourth part owns an interest in the real property described as follows, to-wit:
The East one-half of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 20j the Northeast Quarter of the South20)ltbe^Nortlirest
west Quarter of
Quarter of the
©fASeetion 20;
the Southwest
^the Ifarthoast Quarter of
of Section 29; also, ci
faeaat comer
of thi Northeast 1
20.73 chains, North
,20*73 chains,
South 20 chains to ^
ginning, except
described
2 acres for road,
Range $ l i s t ,
property being in
Salt Lake Base and Meridian>
•AND WHEREAS a l l «f the
owners in a
stress being
Said staea* of
abora^ftesc3
to cartiln l i

s *r* the Joint

entitled
said parties
being desirous by sad through this agreement to deternine the respective rights of said parties*
•NOW THEREFORE, said parties shore nsaed do hereby
oorenant and agree as follows:
•That beginning with tte 1st dsgr of larch of each and every
year, said water from said streaa is to be turned on what
is known as the East Sids Ditch, at a point particularly
described as follows, tonwit:

"said water upon being turned at the above described
point shall flow, for a period of six days and nights,
over the property above described, belonging to the
fourth psrty, above naaed, to-wit, William Booth* Said
water to take a natural oourse over said property, thus
allowing it to flow over the property belonging to the
parties of the first part, situated below point where wnu
is turned into said East Sids Ditch.
"At the and of above stated six day and night period
water shall next be turned and let run and divided in
two placas as follows: twa-thirda to be turned out i n n
ditch described as follows, to-wit:

"and one-third to be turned on
follows, to-witJ

wch described as
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"such water is to be turned and used far the next
period of six days and nights by the parties of the
first part. Said water is to take a natural course over
the land, thus without interruption by any artifioial
means, is to flow and spread over the lands of the
parties of the first part, and by such natural course flows
over portions of the lands of the parties of the third
part and party of the fourth part.
"That at the end of the second six day and night period
said water shall be turned and divided at a point in the
main channel, particularly described as follows, to witt

"so that one-half of said^atrem goes Vest ax^ spreads

"That at the end of said three periods designated above,
a total of twenty-one dagra and nights, said water shall
go back to place of beginning and rotate every twenty-one
days as above described, from the date of March 1st of
each year up to and including the l$th day of November
of each year.
"That on the 15th day of November of each year said water
shall be divided in four parts, one-fourth to be used at
each of the four turning out points above described by
each of the four parties, it being understood that ths
water is to take the sane natural course that it has heretofore SaLd arrangement to oontinue froa said 15th day
of November of each year to the first day of March of the
following year.
"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties above naoed to this
agreement that no new ditches shall be made in ths property owned by the first parties} ths second parties, or
the fourth parties, except upon the mutual agrMisnt of
all parties to this contract; but said parties will have
the right to keep in xwpair and to clean all ditches used
upon said premises.

"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties hereto that no
additional rights can be acquired by any one of the above
named parties, from anyone or all of the other parties,
by adverse uses, prescriptive rights, or otherwise,
other than the rights which are specified in this agreement; except the same i s acquired through sale or purchase.
"IT IS FURTHER AGREED by the parties hereto "that when
any expense is incurred for maintenance of ditches,
making new ditches, building bead-gates, or taking care
of the water in any manner, said expenses shall be borne
equally, one-fourth each to and by the respective parties
hereto.
•IT IS FURTHER AKREED bj the parties hereto that if
said water right Is sold In i t s entirety, that the money
thus obtained from the sale of the same shall be divided
as follows: one-half to the parties of the f i r s t part;
one-eighth to the parties of the second part] one-eighth
to the parties of the third part, and one-fourth to the
party of the fourth part
•IT IS FORMER AGREED lay the parties hereto that during
haying t l m e ^ p i | i s r ^ i | ^ ton or/fiftesn d ^ ; be tsssu
the 1st day of J ^
of each
year, said water;is:£cyfes twwid s t t ths meadow onto other
land to be designated and determined at the discretion
sf the f i r s t , seorad and forarth parties.

tIT IB FQRTHB^A$BP>|^
that the
rtspeettv* p i r t l ^
convenient place to be designaUd by said parties on the 2nd
Tuesday in January of each year to determine axqr matters
of business that night properly COM before said parties*
•IN TEStmasi WHEREOF, the respective parties to this
agreement have hereunto sst tfaiir hands to quadruple < i ypies the day and y**r first above written

Party of the Fourth tart'

T&at at all times since said oral agreement, made in approximately 1?>0, a l l
of the waters of Fishing Creek or Three Kile Creek have been used by the plaintiffs and said defendants in accordance with said agreement* except that in re*
cent years sons new ditches hate been Bade and the old ditches have not always
been kept clean and In repair •
6.

That the plaintiffs and defendants Irathall, Brora and Anderson

entered into a written contrast to govern the use of the water of Three Mile or
Fishing Greek from November l e t to Maroh 1st.

Said agreement i s as follows t

•BOS iOEEHffiirr * a d e ^
Tooele O w * * * ^ * ^ ^
Me jrtfe, M A X B l i A . ^
BOOTHS end IJIXUH MABfeL300TBS/ ^ s wife, MOBHIS
WRATHATT
. , and K j ^ j y ^ ^
W.
PABj^CHIKISS^^
his wife, and SAMUEL H. WBTHIHOTOK and UBBT B. WQRTHIHQTOH, his wife, a l l of Qrantsville, Tooele County,
State of Utah.
•WITHESSETPx
•WHEREAS Fishing Creek, a tributary to Qreat Salt Lake,
is a natural stream flowing in a northwesterly direction
through and supplying water to the lands owned by the
parties hereto or in which they have an interest, to
wit*
Sections $, 6, 7, 8, ?, 16, 17, 18, 1?, 20,
21, 28 and 29, all in Township 2 South, Bang*
5 W. Salt Late Base and Meridian} and
"WHEREAS the parties hereto and their respective predecessors in Interest have for many* years past diverted
and need during the winter months of Bovaaber, December,
January and February of each year all of the waters of
Pishing Creek and have plaoed the sane to beneficial
use upon their respective lands during said winter months
and 9T9 BO t v ae tacwn all of the persons <»i«4»^g *qy
right, title sad interest in and to said stream or th§
waters thereof during said winter months} and

•WHEREAS aome u£ the parties hereto have decided to
change their point of diversion and method and pl^ce
of the use of a portion of the waters of Fishing ^ e e k
and have made applications in the office of the State
Engineer of the State of Utah so to do, which said applications are now pending and which would, in the opinion
of some of the parties hereto, be prejudicial to their
respective rights and would, except for this Agreement,
require protests in the Office of the State Engineer
concerning said pending applications and in all probability would require litigation between the parties.
"NOT, THEREFORE, for the purpose of partitioning and
setting aside to the respeotbr* parties hereto their
share of the waters of eaid oraak during aaid winter
aonths and for the purpoee of avoiding contests, litigation and dieagreeaent beJbaaan the tpartiee hereto and
with the intent and purpose of quitting the respective
claims of the parties hereto the aaid Fiahing Qreek and
the rights to the use of the waters flowing therein, it
is hereby agreed for valuable consideration between the
parties hereto as f ollowsi
"1, That aaid Paul X* Wrathall and Maxwell A* Johnson
shall ba entitled lor purpoeed etorage or otherwiee to
the entire flow of Fiahing Ctaeek daring the months of
January and February of .aaoh year, and the aaid Paul £*
Wrathall being entitled to and undivided Ij/lOth interest
of the flow af aaid Oroek dur^ aaid soothe of January

StiSlrS ^S&S^^^^a^^^SS 5"
aaid Qraek during aaid months of-January and February*
•2. That the remaining>artiea hereto, wis* William
Boothe, Morris Irathall, Irene W. Page, Charles H. WorthIngton and Samuel VU Wbrthington, celleotively ehall ba
entitlad to « * > # a * i » ^ ^
the
months of Kovenber and December of aaoh year and each
of the parties last named ehall ba the ownara and entitled to the use of an undivided l/5th interest In aaid
stream and the flow thereof during aaid months of November and December of aaoh year*
l» It la agreed that each party hereto may institute
such proceedings in the Offloa of the State Engineer or
otherwise as ha may deem desirable or necessary to secure
for himself the maximu benefits of the water portioned
to him by this Agreement, which said applications shall
not be inconsistent with this Agreement, and that no
party hereto will object to or vpoae aaid applications
of the other, but that the rights 1 A and to aaid creek
and the waters thereof shall, regardless of said proceedings in the office of the State Engineer or otherwise,
be and remain as sat forth In this Partition Agreement,
and it la contemplated and Intended that this agreement
shall be controlling and paramount to aaid proceedings
or any certificate pureuant thereto and that aaid proceedings shall be deemed to ba In aid only of the relative
and proportionate rights of the parties hereto as herein
set forth.
*h. It Is contemplated that Paul E* Irathall and
Maxwell A, Johnson will divert their share of the water
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apportioned to them hereby from Fishing Creek and store
the same in a resenroir and that the same may be used
by them during the irrigation season, and in that event
they propose to change the use which they have made of
said water with the result that their share of said water
will not continue to flow through the channel through
which their water has heretofore been distributed and
thence to sons of the remaining parties hereto.
t^^"5. It is agreed that the said Paul E. feathall and
Maxwell A. Johnson will give and grant to the remaining
parties hereto who aay require it, an easement for a
ditch crossing their lands in a direct manner so as to
enable said other parties to conduct the waters from
Pishing Greek to their respectivefendsand In consideration of said grant, the parties receiving said easement
agree that they will maintain the ditches or the easement
thus granted to the end that their share of the water
froa ealdN Fishing Creek will be conducted across the lands
of said Pfcul B« Yrathsll.and Uaxwell A* Johnson and will
not be permitted to flew or flood thereon*
•6. This agrtiSMrt is intended as a partition of the
rights of the ^parties hereto to the winter water only of
Fishing Greek daring the aofcths of lovembcr, Deoember,
January and February of each year and is without pre Judioe to the righta^pf >£aoh$f the parties hereto in respect to the u r f ^ < thai waters of said creek during the
balance of the year*
*IH WITKESS1HEKB0F the parties hereto have hereunto
set their hands the day and year first above written.
/a/ nillaa L. Bobthe
/s/ Morris Wrathall
/s/Lillian Mabel Boothe /s/ Norma A. YSrathall
/a/ Maxwell •. Johnson
/if Paul E. Irathall
/s/ Charles H. Yorthlngton/s/ Carrie Irathall
/a/ Annie Yorthington
/s/ Samuel K. Yorthington
/s/ Irene V. Page by
/s/ Libbie B. Yorthington
/s/ Morris Irathall
"
7«

That since prior to 1920 and continuing until about 1936, the

lands now owned by Irene Page, J* J« Castagno and Edith Castagno, his wife,
Paul E. Irathall and Carrie Wrathall, his wife, and Penina Anderson were all
oimed by Janes L# Wrathall, or his estate, and were operated as one farm; that
all of the lands owned by defendants Brown, and part of the lands of Irene Page
were all acquired on December 30, 188b, by one Jaaes Janea, Jr.,

and the whole

tnereof was thereafter operated as one farm; that the water right of Irene Page
and the water right of Keith Brown have a ccanon origin and should be and are
identical.
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ba^n three
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.... v ( l ic o- -:3'i.r.' Cree*. t h a t s
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- . e .ands of &.11 zi tne pia:ntift?<
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-. ••* *^ *nr defendar
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built

easu1
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- <' tnf

\>>o*'f> ** -xn-i • -
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i "if i"

a-tlf4~ir^

\i
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i

•riicli imd been UWHI

HIU\

i11 most d i t o h li1 and the d i t o h which i t

f i f t y years l a s t past been used to furnish water to the

lands of defendants Irathall and Anderson and to the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson and
Worthingtoni that under ths mutual oral agreement aade and acquiesced in "by the
said parties and their predecessor

f"

Fishing Creek has

,

v Lor from Three Mile or
of the water runs and has run in

t;

for s i x days after which ths easterly most ditch

d

has been shut off dry and t i l ths water i s and lias been diverted int>
ter ditch] thai i t i s and has "been allowed to

\w i

days, after which the ctnV" "tlteh \

•• i "

water 1 ^

ml m-

> >

M'

i

<

» -

ntch l"oi Bi.i

snuL off dry and all of the

iiuorled Wito the westerly aost ditch, where I t Is

and I'Hi in i |iir'i! nil I'i» t«ni UJ ran for nine days, ultflr whloli the westerly must
ditch i s and has been shut off dry and the NUUJX1 la «uiJ lias been t l *
i nto th" easterly moat ditch
\
iha nut
tAiifi"

..

lhat the ditch which IJII» "c i' «.- *

i„ west turn diverts from

ii't '.i j oar ter J-I Section 28, Township 2 South,
M-

' u-in if lately south ol HUB landa of the defendants

Brown described above; that said ditch runs thenoe I
direction, Uirnutfh the northwest quarter i I M h"I• I "'L 1,1,1,1,
Southwest corner 1 f 11• I

I

I ll

I I

ditch * «i

Uiiilii iif ll'*} p l a i n t i f f Page

i ii
iM|

anij

>
crosses the

koU Itrmrn In Section 28; t h a t said
-* -iDe** «> -«*

sing the sectior ^ine which i s eomion to Socti-ns 28 and 2Q sn^

• >s-

w t n e a s t quarter of the northeast quarter of a c t i o n 29; that said ditch then
continues in a general northwesterly direction across the lands of tte p l a i n t i f f s Pare and leaves the west 3ide of the Pane land immediately north of the
section li^e which i s common to Sections 20 and 29; that that ditch then turns
toward the north and runs more or l e s s parallel to the west fence line of Irene
Pare in the southeast quarter of Section 20 adjacent to an area known as the
Blue Lakes; that said Blue Lakes consist of two natural ponds which have been
enlarged and improved 00 that they w i l l store water; that one of said ponds
i s southwest from the other and both are located In Section 20, as aforesaid;
that said east ditch i s so constructed that i t w i l l divert water from Fishing
Creek into the Blue Lakes; that the plaintiffs Johnson have a right to u t i l i s e
the Blue Lakes for storage purposes! together with the defendants Wrathall, but
that the p l a i n t i f f s Worthington have no right to store water in the Blue Lakes;
that there i s an existing ditch which diverts water from the most northerly
Blue Lake near the center of Section 20; that said ditch runs thence i n a general northeasterly direction across the lands of Paul E, Irathall i n tee northeast quarter of Section 20 on to the lands of the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson i n the
southeast quarter of Section 17, across the east half of Section 17 on to the
lands of the p l a i n t i f f s Worthington i n the north half of the northeast quarter
of Section 17; that there i s no ditch now i n existence which w i l l connect the
west ditch to the ditch from the northerly Blue Lake, and that water can only
be diverted from the west ditch by f i r s t diverting i t into and through the
Blue Lakes; that i t i s practical to construct a ditch which w i l l connect the
west ditch with the ditch from Blue Lakes; that said connecting ditch would
cross the land of the defendant Penina Anderson in Section 20; that Penina
Anderson and her l e s s e e , Paul Wrathall, have agreed to convey a right of way
across said land immediately north of and adjacent to the dam on the northerly
Blue Lake to connect the west ditch with the ditch from the Blue Lakes, said
conveyance to be to the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson and w orthingtona and the p l a i n t i f f s
Johnson and Worthington have agreed to pay to defendant Paul Irathall and Penina
after
W. Anderson the sum of $100*00 for said right of wayP and that/said ditch i s
constructed the p l a i n t i f f s Worthington should take their water to their lands
through the »est ditch, thence through the new connecting ditch across the lands

-

1$ -

of Penlna Anderson and thence through the e x i s t i n g ditch from the northerly
Blue Lake, across the lands of Anderson, Vfrathall and Johnson to the lands of
the Worthingtons, and the p l a i n t i f f s Worthington should not thereafter have
the r i g h t to flood their water across the lands of the Johnsons, Wrathalls or
Anderson; that the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson should take t h e i r water through the west
ditch and e i t h e r use the same through the Blue Lakes, or use the sarae through
the aforementioned connecting d i t c h , but the p l a i n t i f f s Johnson should not,
after the connecting ditch i s constructed, have the r i g h t to flood their water
across the lands of the Defendants Anderson or Wrathall.

That said wast ditch

i s shown on p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit B with a purple l i n e and aald leap i s hereby
referred to for further c e r t a i n t y .
10.
party in

That the location of the various t r a c t s of land owned by each

relationship

to the t r a c t s owned by other p a r t i e s i s shown on p l a i n t -

i f f s 1 Exhibit B, and said e x h i b i t i a herety r e f e r r e d to for further certainty;
that i t i s wasteful to permit the water t o flow continuously over the lands to
the head of the system, as has been done i n the p a s t , and t h a t i t i s against
public policy t o permit said continued wastej t h a t the defendants prefer to hare
said waters taken from their lands except during their own water turns, and
the p l a i n t i f f s prefer to take said water i n turns through ditches rather than
to obtain i t only after the water has been flooded over the lands of others.
11.

That the diverting works and ditches which are maintained to

u t i l i z e the waters of Three Mile Creek or Fishing Creek are in need of repair;
that said ditches and diverting works should be cleaned and repaired, and the
expense of such repair work and expense of future maintenance of said ditches
should be shared by the p a r t i e s in accordance with the provisions of Section
100-1-9, Utah Code Annotated, 19^3.
12.

The court finds t h a t the d i t c h which has been used to convey

water for what has formerly been known as the center turn i s the old natural
channel as i t runs northwesterly through the lands of the defendants jrown in
Section 28; that i t crosses i n t o the southrost quarter of the-southwest quarter
of Sect ion 21 and thence into uhe lands of the p l a i n t i f f Page in the southeast
quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 20; that p a r t of said natural channel

is shown by orange lines on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B, and said exhibit is hereby
referred to for further certainty as to the location of said natural channel,
and any of the parties should be permitted to use said natural channel and
should be permitted to clean, repair and maintain said natural channel across the
lands of the defendants Brown and the plaintiff Page; that during the periods of
time when other persons are entitled to use the water, said natural channel is
not to be obstructed by the defendants Brown, but during the times the defendants Brown are entitled to use the water they may temporarily obstruct said
natural channel to divert water therefrom} that if said natural channel is
used by more than one person to divert water upon the lands of these parties,
then there shall be installed on slid natural channel suitable diverting works
and headgates so that the water can be diverted from said natural channel or
returmd to said natural channel from any artifioal ditches by permanently
constructed mechanical type headgates, and the expense of said construction
shall be borne jointly by the persons using said natural channel in accordance
with the provisions of Section 110-1-9, Utah Cods Annotated, lft), and each of
the partis s should be enjoined from placing obstructions across said natural
channel which are not so designed that they can be mechanically opened to permit the water to pass through when said obstruction is not being used to divert
water »
13.

That the ditches which have been used for the east turn consist

of several ditches across the lands of the defendants Brown and the plaintiff
Page; that instead of using the water through said existing ditches across the
lands of the defendants Brown, a new ditch should be constructed at the joint
expense of those who desire to use it down the easterly side of the property of
the defendants Brown in the Southwest quarter of Section 21 and the Nortfasest
quarter of Section 28, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, but said ditch must not
be construe tad on the lands of the defendants Brown which are irrigated at the
present time, but that said ditch shouldrtmyeast of said hay grounds. It is,
however, expressly provided that said ditch need not be constructed along the
east ffcnce on the defendants9 property, but that said ditch may be constructed
immediately adjacent to but east of the irrigated or hay grounds*

lln

That until the new ditches provided for above are made, the

parties hereto may continue to use the water as it has been used in the past,
by flooding it across the upper lands; that within six months from the date of
this decree all new ditches, headgates, diverting works and repairs should be
made, and thereafter only three ditches should be used by the downstream users,
to wit, (a) the west ditch through the connecting ditch across the Penina
Anderson property and thence across the Anderson, Wrathall, Johnson and Worthington properties; (b) the old natural channel through the properties of the
defendants Brown and the plaintiff Page; and (c) the new ditch along the east
side of the Brown property; that In the event plaintiff Irene Page does not
grant rights of way across her property to plaintiffs Castagno and Worthington
for the conveying of the water to the head of the Castagno lands along a route
which is feasible, then the plaintiffs Castagno and the plaintiffs Worthington
shall have the oontlxraed easement and right to flood the Irene Page land to get
the water to their land, and shall have the right to clean all exieting ditches,
as shown on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B^at reasonably frtc^nt^Jjhtervals, and during
the t i n the plaintiffs Castagno and the plaintiffs Worthington are entitled
to use the water no obstructions of any kind shall be plaoed in any of the ditches
which cross the land of Irene Page.
15 • The court finds that on an average from the first day of March
to the 31st day of October, inclusive, Three Mile or Fishing Greek will yield
twelve acre feet of water per day at the point of diversion which formerly has
been used by the parties for the east, the middle and the vest turns; Jthat the
stream may fluctuate slightly above or slightly below said average, and in determining the number of days each year during which each of the parties is to
be permitted to use the water the computation shall always be based upon the
assumption that said stream yields twelve acre feet per day*
16.

That because of the manner in which the water has been used in

the past, as reflected by the contract which is set out in full In paragraph J>
hereof, the lands at the head of the «yste* should be granted a better water
right than the lands at the lower end of the system, but all the lands should
receive sone water throughout the irrigation season.

The court further finds

that in the 2U-5 day-

om March 1st to October 31st, inclusive, the stream will

yield an averace of

ive acre feet per day, or a total of 29hO acre feet which

should be divided ar^

the parties a3 follows:

Areas
Irrigated

Name

Portion of
Stream Awarded
Each Irrigation
Season

Number Aore
Feet Available
On Average

102.0

k.o

U08/29h0ths

8.0

U#o

32/29U0ths

Keith Brown, Elva Brc> , Quin- 76.0
ten Brown, Mrs. Quint
-own,
Jack Brown and Dona E.

luO

30i*/29UOths

Irene Page
fcenina W# Anderson

Paul E. Wrathall and L
Wrathall

.-!•., Igfttf

• 537/29UOths

4*so a*. f|jy

J. J. Castagno and E&*
Castagno

^m

3#7S

369/29UOths

Maxwell A. Johnson ana
Erna Johnson

ISSiS

3#0

6ffi/29it0th8

2*8

6l8/29iiOth«

Samuel H. Worthington, L_vby 232*0
B. Worthington, Charle
Worthington and Annie
Worthington
^

17.

That at **• r*oint where water has been diverted in the past for the

east, the center and ti

at turns, new diverting works should be constructed

to divert water into th

ree ditches which are to be used as specified above

in paragraph UU, and th

iall be installed at equal height elevations* The

oost of said installatl

^all be prorated among the parties on U B basis of

the amount of water aw*

hereby to each.

18.

The use of

individual will have an

.> water is to be rotated in turns, so that each
- 1 number of turns each season, and if ha so elects

during his turn will hat.

*> entire flow of said stream for the entire period

of each of his turns. I

~ event the parties can not unanimously agree as

to the period of time wtr

should elapse between turns, the use should be ro-

tated on a fifteen day b*

and each user shall tatae the water awarded to

him hereby in sixteen ,16) turns of equal duration,
19.

That in early days prior to 1900 there was a natural channel which

ran from Three iiile or Kisning Creek northerl

through the lands of all of the

parties involved tereinj that said channel was lcarer than tte surrounding lands,
and it was difficult to maintain diverting dams to divert the water from the
natural channel on to the surrounding lands; that the center ditch, as shown
on plaintiffs1 Exhibit B, is the natural channel as it passes through the
properties of the defendants Brown and enters upon the properties of the plaintiff Page) that other sections of the natural channel have been from tine to
time abandoned, and by the mutual consent and aoqoiesenee of the parties have
been replaced by other ditches*
20.

That the lands purchased by the defendants Brown from Francis

Hunter have no water rights from Fishing Creek} that water was first used thereon
in approximately 1926; that no filing was made in the office of the State Engineer; that the use of water thereon was not adverse to aqr of the other parties; that the use of water beginning in 1926 would not constitute an appropriation.
21.

That Milo Q. Higley filed Application No. 17839 in the office

of the State Engineer on the 15th ^

;

^

second

feet of water from Fishing Creek; that said application was approved, but limited to a use of water from October 1st to October 31st of each year) that said
approval by the State Engineer was expressly made subject to prior rights; that
the rights of the parties as set forth above, require all of the waters of
Fishing Creek for year around use, and the defendants Higley have no right to
use water from Fishing Creek.
22.

That defendants Robert Lawrence and Delia Lawrence, his wife,

have no water rights in Fishing Creek; that Maxwell A. Johnson is purchasing
all of the lands of the Alex Johnson estate, which were irrigated from Fishing
Croek, and said lands and the water rights therefor are included in the acre8Lgef and the water to be awarded to Maxwell A. Johnson and orna Johnson, his
wjfe.

23*

l'hat the lands of all of the parties described ibove are alkaline;

that by applying water to the lands the alkaline salts have been washed therefrom; that in the lands which have been irrigated in the past the salts have
been for theroostpart washed from the lands and the waste water from upper
irrigation is not laden with alkaline salts; that if any of the parties commence
the irrigation of lands which have not been irrigated in the past, said salts
will probably beoowa laden with alkaline salts until said lands have been washed
clean, and that said waste waters flowing from said new lands should be controlled by Q* owner of the land 00 irrigated so that the salt laden waters
will not flow on to and deposit the water and salts on the lands of the lower
users} that subject to this'condition the oartias shall have the right to irrigate any of the lands ^described above, and If any party shall desire to file a
change application t^^irr'^gatejothar lands with the water awarded to him by the
decree, no other par^^^

to protest said change application;

and this decree ahan Dewiv^* f prejudice to the right of any party to file
a change a p p H o a t t o n m ^

parties so

irrigating new lands will taice care or^nia waste water so as not to deposit
alkaline salts on the lands of loser users*
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following
Conclusions of Las*
CONCLUSIONS OF IM
1,

That a decree should be entered quieting t i t l e to the use of

water of Three Mils or Fishing Creek) that said decree should divide the use
of the water from March 1st to March 31st as follows:

Naue
Irene Page
Penina W.inderson

Area
Irrigated

Number Acre
Feet Available on
Average

Portion of
Stream Awarded
Each Irrigation
Season

102.0

lt.0

It08/29lt0tha

8.0

U.O

32/29UOths

U.O

30U/29UOtha

Kaith Brown, Blra Brows, Quia- 76.0
ten Brown, Mr a. Quintan Brown,
Jack Brown and Dona Brown

Area
Irrigated

Name
Paul K. ffrathall and
Carrie Wrathall

Number Acre
Feet Available
on Average

13/.25

Portion of
Stream Awarded
£ach Irrigation
Season

3.75 +* f * \ 537/29hOths
q,** e>* fm^r-iffc-

J. J. Castagno and Edi'
Castagno

98.U

3.75

369/29l40tns

Maxwell k. Johnson and
Erna Johnson

192.5

3.50

67U/29hOths

Samuel H. Worthington, ' b y
B* Worthington, Charle1
Worthington and Annie I
Worthington

232*0

2*8

6l8/29UOths

That the irrigation sear or, should be fixed as beginning March 1st and ending
October 31st*
2.

That from V

mber 1st to the following March 1st the use of water

should be governed by th& written contract which i s set forth above in f u l l in
the Findings of Fact*
3.

The use of water i s to be rotated in turns, so that each individ-

ual w i l l have an equal nun ?r of turns each Irrigation season and may. i f he so
e l e c t s , during his turn hava the entire flow of said stream for the entire
period of each of his turn*.

In the event the parties can not uananlmously

agree as to the period of tr'iae which should elapse betireen turns the use should
be rotated on a fifteen day basis, and each user shall take the water awarded
him hereby in sixteen turns ->t equal duration, so that he w i l l takB one-sixteenth of the total water eroded to him hereby erery fifteen days during the
irrigation season.
h*

That the practice indulged in in the past of flooding the water

continuously over the upstrsi^a lands of the upper users i s wasteful and contrary to public policy; that each user should be given the right to take the
water to the head of his larvi in a closed ditch i f he so e l e c t s , without f i r s t
spreading i t over the lands of others above him*
5.

The cost of cleaning, repairing and maintaining the ditches and

irrigation system should be pro-rated aaong the users in accordanoe with the

- *2

-

provision of Section l X ) - l - 9 , Utah Code Annotated, iyi*3.
6.

The > i a i n t i f f s We*6Myeglft&=as4 Johnson sho^ld^e adjudged t o have

t&e r i g h t to divert w a ^ r through the e x i s t i n g ^ r ^ s t ditch Zs the Blue Lakes,
/tirough the Blue Lakes to tn^headgajie^on the northerly end thereof, through
said headgate into the exia^itlgaS^ch which leads to and across the lands of
the p l a i n t i f f J o h n j p n f t h a t suitable a s s u r i n g devices should be i n s t a l l e d
thereon as J ^ p r o r l d e d i n the Findings of F w t , and the headgate on Blue Lakes
vshouitlbe l e f t ,
7.

That the d i t c h which has been used for the center turn through the

lands of the defendants Brown and the p l a i n t i f f Page i s the natural channel,
and any party has the r i g h t to use the same, and t o keep the same cleared of
obstructions and i n repair*
8.

That the f i l i n g s made by the various p a r t i e s , as set f o r t h i n the

Findings of Fact, ahould be affirmed i n accordance with t h e terms of the w r i t ten s t i p u l a t i o n , subject, however, t o t h e i r being approved i n accordance w i t h
the laws of the State of Utah i n the office of the State i n g i n e e r .
9*

That the defendants Hilo 0. Higley and Blanche Higley, h i s wife,

and Robert Lawrence and Delia Lawrence, h i s wife, have no water r i g h t s i n Three
Uile Springs or Fiahing Creek and each of them should be enjoined from d i v e r t ing or using water therefrom.
10,

That the decree should be without prejudice t o the r i g h t of any

party to f i l e a change application, and t h a t the decree should provide that
if mfgrjjarty i r r i g a t e s new or different lands he must take care of h i s waste
W 4 t ^ r ! ; W ^ ^ t ^ ? ^ J ^ ^ s a l t s washed from the new lands w i l l not be d e posited j o i ^ ^ ^ c ^

of any other party hereto.

I3J^TKafcj51icH"1of the p a r t i e s should bear h i s own costs incurred
h0reln#

'

rt
Dated t h i s

«£*4^
/

N*«y of k*£**i,

1950.

Tab 5

1020000

i?t/

afc<\vrv\v\<i

•-U

a

2^y ^pji^ v^ ex
J

-X^.\

U*N*-^

AVJL

UJO-JVI

V\*-VJ*A

Q V / ^ ~\\oiP

Luou

~tUvs
(3)

2

(HJ j

-TxtvvA.

\oo\v5

tuA\

bill

/" a//

yjoS* Jo

J<d

-teqp

k>oo(J

06 ~fi Uoo Vv^teA <\
a . uc\V\i

-flu.

'fo TCUL /lev:T

u u A ^ v^iotu . / ^ p i m d o ^ J

to^i

•fyu.QuenTt"

SpAVujay.

"/^

, W

#/<u^

OK ^>u<^\

XCAJ

-^(

iWt

Loo la h<z.

tuicL (\<K4

\\t:.-

'

»*

**** ** Wen*
^

c/o^

-^A'^ ^ ^ T i ;

a^'alu"

£„£*/ ^ f

^ /

4w
••••'• J / ' . - : : ti

.

-^

4-

eW
~""'

;V^

/jae/d
""«<•

- /'-^-..yj

j

,,

a^-f 0OX
f
™<>T

....•?:•:.
-L-;
••r::~±.j

/'.4

vv.-:/':
.-:/-

,

/*,*«
tHccAtu

i ,,.. Y
. J^)

jv;

I

1 *

»•

c •

':

V
'

J>i\-

-y\x

\\,....

L. '-V--,

• y>
.

J-I

-Vx

-V

<

*.;

V

I

V-i

V;

««-

V
0000 JO"!

STATE OF UTAH
NATURAL RESOURCES

Norman H. Bangerter. Govern<
Dee C. Hansen. Executive Oirectc
Robert L Morgan, State Engine*

Water Rights
1636 West North Temple- Suite 2?U • Salt Lake City t i l l " ' '- • i' •.. JMII M • /,n/i
Juno

Russell Johnson
P.O. Box 78
Grantsvillef UT
Re:

?,

1986

84029

Wrathal-Johnson Reservoir (Bln^ Tokos)

Gentlemen:
The regular periodic inspection of * ho above clam was performed on May 20,
1986. In attendance were Ward Waq-.tnff and nill Smart representing the Division of Water Rights and Russell Johnson representing the owners.
The inspection revealed that the following conditions exist:

1.

The embankment has inadequate freeboard and has suffered severe1erosional
damage along the water line. 4 Tn some places along the north dike, wave
action has almost washed throuah the embankment.
The outlet was completely inonotable.

3.

There was no actual spillway for rhe dam. The water level in the reservoir was maintained by outflow throuah a marsh area around the east end
of the northeast dike.

4.

The reservoir received water from rhe Grnnrsville sewage treatment ponds,
and in effect, acts as an additional pond in the series.

5.

The embankment is quite low - porhaps 10 feet at the highest point- and
the upstream slope into the reservoir is very shallow.
A wash-out
failure to the dam would probably occur slowly rather than suddenly, and
would probably cause little damaqe downstream except possibly to a few
gravel roads.

Mr. Johnson stated that the reservoir had not actively been used for many
years and that to his knowledqe, there was no valid water right for the water
in the reservoir.
After reviewinq the status and condition of tho darn, it is our conclusion that
the owners* have the option of abandoning the dam, which would include breaching itl to a poir^t where the reservoir is stabilized, or repairing the dam and
resuming its use I
If the dam is to be repaired, the followinq conditions must be met:
1.

A valid water riqht for the impoundment must be obtaine"d.
coordinated through the appropriate area office.

This should be

n n n m n**>

Russell Johnson
Page 2 of 2
June 2, 1986
2.

The embankment must be repaired where it has been damaged by erosion.
The height of the dam relative to the water level must also be increased
so that there is adequate frooboatd.

3.

An adequate spillway must be constructed.

4.

The outlet must be replaced.

5.

Other related problems which should be corrected at the time the repairs
are made include the removal of t ron<* and rodents and repairs of the tree
and rodent damage, and the dra inane of the bog away from the toe of the
dam.

You are hereby granted thirty days from the date of this letter to notify us
of your intentions regarding the subject dam. If you have problems contacting
the other owners or determining who they are, please feel free to let us knowAfter'•jwe have received your reply, we will respond in detail concerning the
requirements for the dam.
If any of the above require further discussion or clarification, please feel
free to contact Richard Hall or Ward Wagstaff of the Dam Safety Section.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

Robert L. Morgan, P.E.
State Engineer
RLM:rbh:ww
cc:

Jesse Anderson, Weber Area Officr

0000198

STATE OF UTAH
NATURAL RESOURCES

Norman H Bangerter. Governor
Dee C. Hansen. Executive Director
Robert L Morgan. State Engineer

Water Rights
1636 West North Temple • Suite 220 • Salt Lake City. UT 84116-3156 * 801-533-6071

May 5 ,

1986

Paul Wrathal/Max Johnson
Grantsville, Utah
84029
Re:

Wrathal/Johnson Dam

Gentlemen:
Sections 73-5-5 and 73-5-6 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 charge the State
Engineer (The Utah Division of Water Rights) with the responsibility of irtspecting dams in Utah. The State Engineer is also charged with the responsibility to direct the owners to make any repairs which, based on the inspection , could threaten the integrity* of the dam, the spillways, the outlets, or
other related facilities.
This year's dam inspection is scheduled for Tuesday, May 20, 1986. We will
meet at Wrathal/Johnson Dam at 9:00 a.m.
Please have an owner's representative present at the dam to answer questions and operate the outlet and any
appurtenant facilities.
If you have any questions, scheduling conflicts, or you can not arrange to
have a representative at the site, please contact the Dam Safety Section of
this office. Your cooperation will be appreciated.
Sincerely,

Richard B. Hall, P.E.
Directing Dam Safety Engineer
RBH/cp
cc:

Jesse Anderson, Weber Area Engineer
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